US Army War College

USAWC Press
Monographs
4-1-2010

Shades of CORDS in the Kush: The False Hope of "Unity of Effort"
in American Counterinsurgency
Henry Nuzum Mr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs

Recommended Citation
Nuzum, Henry Mr., "Shades of CORDS in the Kush: The False Hope of "Unity of Effort" in American
Counterinsurgency" (2010). Monographs. 347.
https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/347

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Monographs by an authorized administrator of USAWC Press.

Letort Paper
SHADES OF CORDS IN THE KUSH:
THE FALSE HOPE OF “UNITY OF EFFORT”
IN AMERICAN COUNTERINSURGENCY
Henry Nuzum
April 2010

Visit our website for other free publication
downloads
http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/
To rate this publication click here.

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and
do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the
Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the
U.S. Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI)
publications enjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not
disclose classified information, jeopardize operations security,
or misrepresent official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom
empowers them to offer new and sometimes controversial
perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues.
This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.
*****
This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, Sections
101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be copyrighted.

*****
Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be
forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War
College, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244.
*****
This document was written in 2007 as an M.A. thesis for Johns
Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Mr. Nuzum’s
project advisor for this thesis was Dr. Tom Keaney.
*****
All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications are
available on the SSI homepage for electronic dissemination free
of charge. Hard copies of this report may also be ordered from
our homepage free of charge. SSI’s homepage address is: www.
StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.
*****
The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail
newsletter to update the national security community on the
research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and
upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter
also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research
analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please
subscribe on our homepage at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.
mil/newsletter/.

ISBN 1-58487-435-X

ii

FOREWORD
Counterinsurgency (COIN) requires an integrated
military, political, and economic program best developed by teams that field both civilians and soldiers.
These units should operate with some independence
but under a coherent command. In Vietnam, after
several false starts, the United States developed an
effective unified organization, Civil Operations and
Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), to
guide the counterinsurgency. CORDS had three
components absent from our efforts in Afghanistan
today: (1) sufficient personnel (particularly civilian),
(2) numerous teams, and (3) a single chain of command
that united the separate COIN programs of the disparate American departments at the district, provincial,
regional, and national levels. This monograph focuses
on the third component, describing the benefits that
unity of command at every level would bring to the
American war in Afghanistan.
Section 1 sets forth a brief introduction to
counterinsurgency theory, using a population-centric
model, and examines how this warfare challenges
the United States. Section 2 traces the evolution of the
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the country team; Section 3 describes problems at both levels.
For comparison, in Section 4, the author examines
similar efforts in Vietnam, where persistent executive
attention finally integrated the government’s counterinsurgency campaign under the unified command of
the CORDS program. Section 5 discusses the American tendency towards a segregated response to cultural differences between the primary departments,
executive neglect, and societal concepts of war. Section
6 argues that in its approach to COIN, the United
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States has forsaken the military concept of unity of
command in favor of “unity of effort” expressed
in multiagency literature. Sections 7 and 8 describe
how unified authority would improve our efforts in
Afghanistan and propose a model for the future.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
The past 2 years have been the most violent of the
Afghan insurgency thus far. Taliban and affiliates
seek to undermine the state and sap the will of the
occupying force. In response, the United States and
the coalition pursue a counterinsurgency (COIN)
campaign that coordinates military, political, and
economic assistance to the Afghan government so
that it may provide security and services to its people.
If the effort succeeds, the government will win the
confidence of the citizens, who will increasingly reject
the insurgents.
To achieve this unified program at a subregional
level, the United States has deployed civil-military
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) across the
country. The collocation of different departmental
representatives has improved the American response
to insurgency. However, the program faces obstacles—
too few civilians, too few teams, and multiple chains of
command. This monograph examines the last aspect,
the absence of a unified authority to guide American
PRTs, and more briefly considers the management of
our nationwide efforts.
Each PRT has nearly 100 uniformed members
and two or three representatives of civilian agencies.1
Guidance from Washington has divided the team’s
mission into three spheres: improving security, which
falls to the military team leader; enhancing the capacity of the government in the provinces, the purview
of the State Department officer; and facilitating reconstruction, the responsibility of the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) representative.
The first team deployed in the fall of 2002; today,
there are 25 PRTs in Afghanistan, a dozen of which are
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American. While the teams have increased the standing
of the government in the hinterlands, the absence of
unified authority diminishes their impact. Because
the military, State, and USAID personnel report
through separate chains of command, performance
depends on the relationships between departmental
representatives. When personalities mesh, teams
function well. However, because there is no on-site
arbiter, and recourse to Kabul is convoluted, conflicts
may fester without resolution.
Similar problems plague regional and national
efforts. PRTs, led originally by Army Civil Affairs
officers and now by Air Force and Navy officers, have
uncertain influence over battalions led by combat
arms officers. When the demands of reconstruction
and traditional use of force compete, the Regional
Commander (who directs maneuver battalions and the
military elements of PRTs) arbitrates, often in favor of
combat arms priorities. At the national level, General
David Barno and Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad
established a tight relationship which improved civilmilitary coordination. However, the arrangement depended on those individuals. It was not an enduring
construct and lapsed under their successors.
The United States is not new to this type of war.
As Washington increased its commitment to South
Vietnam through the mid-1960s, several departments
directed segregated counterinsurgency programs.
After numerous attempts failed to unify American
COIN efforts, President Lyndon Johnson initiated the
Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development
Support program in 1967. CORDS assigned responsibility for counterinsurgency to the military and
integrated all programs, including civilian, under its
command. A 3-star equivalent civilian director, serving
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as a component commander of U.S. fighting forces
in Vietnam, led the new organization. Civilians and
uniformed members were interspersed throughout
the organization and were vested with full authority
over subordinates, no matter their parent department,
agency, or service. Along with these organizational
changes, the program dramatically increased the
money and manpower devoted to counterinsurgency.
It is true that the vast majority of the American military,
which focused on conventional campaigns and assisting the South Vietnamese army, was excluded from
CORDS’s purview, as were national level civilian
programs.2 In spite of these shortcomings, the organization effectively integrated, within its parameters,
the security, political, and economic portions of the
COIN campaign from the district to national levels and
contributed to the defeat of the Viet Cong insurgency.
Despite this success, the United States has neglected
the lessons of Vietnam for at least three reasons. First,
due to cultural differences, agencies resist integration.
Second, the executive branch has not matched the
prolonged attention of the Johnson administration that
overcame this bureaucratic resistance. Finally, societal
conceptions of war, instilled during World War II and
reinforced by the purported failures in Korea and
Vietnam as well as the exaggerated success in the Gulf
War, tend to reserve the battlefield for the warrior
alone, free from political interference and noncombatant complexities at the tactical level, and supported by
the nation’s full might. Insurgency violates this model:
it is an intimately political form of warfare in which
fighter and bystander are interspersed, with limits on
use of force. Moreover, insurgency must be met by
American civilians as well as Soldiers.
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Since American society and its leaders have been
slow to accept COIN as war, the government has not
applied the joint model of unity of command to our
multiagency efforts in Afghanistan, instead accepting
a weak surrogate, “unity of effort.” In the place of the
imperative language of unified authority, the doctrine
and directives for the disparate departments urge
cooperation, coordination, and consensus, the soft
tools of combined warfare. These mechanisms are the
strongest available to manage an unwieldy coalition
of sovereign state entities, such as the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF),3 but are far from the
strongest available for our own COIN efforts, which
still account for half of the international involvement
in Afghanistan.
While collocation has brought great benefits
to PRTs, the lack of unity of command prevents
further integration of the teams. Unified authority
would eliminate the long, multiple chains of remote
management which impede decision. Additionally,
a clear command structure would reduce the role of
personality which now unduly influences leadership
dynamics among the three senior PRT officials.
Most importantly, unity of command would couple
responsibility and authority. Today’s model of tripartite
command gives each representative the authority to
act in his own sphere: the USAID representative runs
reconstruction, the State representative directs political
programs, and the military team leader is responsible
for security. But in COIN, as the widespread use of the
Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP)
demonstrates,4 action in one sphere affects all three.
Each representative, reporting to a distant senior, acts
to improve his department’s sphere, with less concern
about the significant effects of that activity in the other
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two. By uniting command at the provincial level, a
single PRT leader, with authority to direct action in
every sphere and responsible for effects provincewide, could appropriately manage the broad impact of
each decision beyond its bureaucratic sphere of origin.
In Afghanistan, the United States should build
on the CORDS concept, uniting all our civilian and
military efforts. The American command should
designate one team leader of each PRT. In stable
provinces, a civilian should lead, with a uniformed
deputy; where significant combat continues, a military
officer should lead, assisted by a civilian deputy. The
Regional Commands should adopt a similar model. At
the national level, a civilian ambassador, aided by a
general as a deputy and an ample staff, should direct
all American activities in Afghanistan through the
Regional Commands and PRTs.
This monograph will focus on American efforts in
the country, rather than those of the broader coalition.
If the United States can take complete responsibility for
two of ISAF’s four regions and resurrect the solution it
devised in Vietnam, it may influence by example the
command structure of the coalition.
Diffuse command is not the only challenge we face
in Afghanistan. In theater, the greatest obstacles are
the tenacity of the enemy and the low capacity of the Afghan government; other impediments include coalition
dynamics, organizations ill-suited for COIN, and a
lack of familiarity with the host nation. Furthermore,
departmental divisions in Washington, exacerbated
by congressional loyalties, impede our multiagency
effort. Nor is the lack of unified authority the only
problem with PRTs; with so few teams and so few
civilians, progress will remain slow. I limit my scope to
ambiguous management because this organizational
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problem requires almost no new resources to remedy,
its correction will quickly address oft-cited problems,
and the solution simply makes sense.
ENDNOTES
1. This monograph uses “agency” and “department”
interchangeably to refer to the Defense Department, Department
of Agriculture, State Department, and USAID. USAID is
technically part of the State Department but largely functions as a
separate department in Afghanistan.
2. Such as USAID programs run from Saigon.
3. ISAF is the international coalition leading security efforts in
Afghanistan.
4. CERP authorizes military commanders to fund humanitarian and civic projects to alleviate suffering among locals and
decrease the likelihood of continued violence. This is traditionally
a role that might fall to a development organization such as
USAID.
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SECTION I. THE STAGE
For 2 1/2 centuries, the government in Kabul has
struggled to rule its realm. Regional and global powers
have interfered with the country’s affairs, pitting
Afghan against Afghan by exploiting ethnic tensions
along borders dictated by colonial interests. Today’s
insurgency once again undermines the state, hindered
and aided by external powers, as it seeks to extend its
writ to the hinterlands. Violence has increased as the
population, disappointed with a young government’s
inability to provide security, lacks the confidence to
reject the guerrillas.
After quickly sweeping the Taliban from power
and al Qaeda from its sanctuaries, American forces
and coalition partners have extended their presence
beyond the capital and into the provinces. In the south
and east,1 however, insurgents have accelerated their
campaign to undermine the central government,
with much of the rise in violence occurring since the
beginning of 2006.2 Suicide attacks, seldom seen in
Afghanistan before the American invasion, are now
frequent.3
THE STATE AND THE INSURGENCY—THEORY
IN THE AMERICAN CONTEXT
Although unprepared for this form of warfare
that dominates the Global War on Terror (GWOT),
American forces were involved in counterinsurgencies
throughout the 20th century.4 In these efforts, the U.S.
Government tried to support nascent or recuperating
states against an insurgency, a “protracted struggle
conducted methodically, step by step, in order to attain
specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the
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overthrow of the existing order.”5 The local government, as assisted by its American patron, competes
against the insurgency for legitimacy in the eyes of the
population. Today, as much as ever, asymmetry characterizes these wars, as rebels employ lightly armed,
loosely organized groups of fighters. The supported
government benefits from the resources, advice, and
sometimes armor and airpower of its superpower
sponsor.
Different Models.
Because of their disparities in power, the two sides
typically use different strategic models and perceive
different vulnerabilities. U.S. culture tends toward a
conventional mindset, in which generals try to defeat
the enemy by crushing his forces or capturing his
capital.6 Even when combating an insurgency, this
mentality is difficult to escape, and enemy body count
appeals to many officials as an indicator of success.
Insurgents, fighting in their own territory, cannot hope
to destroy an occupying American force; rather, they
hope to outlast it by eroding American popular support for the expedition. By creating insecurity and
attacking development, they seek to undermine the
confidence of the local population in its government
and fuel resentment of the occupying power. The
insurgents expect the superpower’s patience to expire
as progress stalls and casualties mount. American
departure will leave the struggling state vulnerable to
overthrow or disintegration.
Each side follows different operational guidelines—American forces, developed for conventional
war, have trained and organized for conflicts of maneuver and attrition, in which they sweep the enemy’s
divisions from the field; they may train and equip their
2

native allies in this image.7 Acknowledging the might
of American forces, insurgents try to avoid pitched
battles that would expose them to overwhelming
firepower. They hide among the population and harass
the occupier and its government ally with small attacks.
Through these surreptitious strikes the guerrillas hope
to provoke an indiscriminate allied response which
will alienate the population from the state and its
partner. From the population’s acquiescence and intimidation, the insurgent gains shelter, food, and arms,
while also depriving the government of the intelligence
necessary to distinguish fighter from citizen.
Public Support—The Center of Gravity.
Insurgents are correct to perceive public opinion
as the center of gravity. Insurgents attack popular
support at three levels: local support for the state (and,
by extension, its occupying sponsor) in theater, the
home front of the occupying power (I will refer to this
American support as “domestic”), and international
sentiment. By targeting American domestic sentiment
and native opinion, the insurgents hope to force an
American withdrawal, leaving the nascent government vulnerable. The primary determinants of American public support for a war include the perceived
probability of success, costs (human and financial), and
stakes of the conflict.8 Should success seem too remote,
the costs too high, or the stakes insignificant, popular
backing will falter.
If the insurgents gain native support, or at least
acquiescence, the occupier will be unable to remove the
rebel from his popular base. With no local acceptance
of the occupation, success is unlikely and the American
public will eventually turn against the war. If the
insurgents undermine the morale of the American
3

home front by increasing perceived costs, American
forces will probably withdraw as officials respond to
electoral pressures.9 Finally, the stakes always seem
lower for the occupying power than for the insurgents
who portray their struggle as one of national survival,
and as the war drags on, this apparent disparity in
stakes grows and Americans begin to question the
benefit of perseverance.
The insurgency will exploit all these vulnerabilities
simultaneously. However, its direct influence is
strongest over native support, so it focuses on
undermining the popular confidence in the local
government and occupation and deterring cooperation
through intimidation. The dynamics of native support
for the state, without which American public backing
will eventually crumble, create an asymmetry of
contending determinants which favors the insurgency.
To gain local acceptance, American forces must protect
a vast majority of the population as the state is not yet
capable of doing so; to undermine confidence in the
state and its superpower ally, the insurgency need not
capture any territory or destroy conventional units, but
rather only attack a few citizens periodically to spread
insecurity among all. To win local confidence, U.S.
forces must reconstruct the country; the insurgency
only need sabotage projects to puncture the promises
of the occupation. In seeking to establish the legitimacy
of the new government, the occupation may organize
elections, and the new officials must endure voters’
inevitable disappointments regarding the pace of
reconstruction; the insurgents only need to intimidate
candidates and disrupt voting to diminish the faith of
the public in the new system.
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The American Response.
Despite its conventional dominance, economic
power, and technological advantages, the United States
faces significant disadvantages in counterinsurgency
(COIN). Our conventional concept of war as the
destruction of an enemy army loses relevance where
no conventional force exists. Instead, the American
government, like the rebels, must make war indirectly
by fostering native support. This approach has the best
chance of prevailing in the field, and for justifying the
war at home.
To gain local support, or at least acceptance, the
American government must pursue a COIN strategy
by combining military, political, and economic efforts
at the community level to separate the insurgency from
its popular base. Successful COIN campaigns rely on
tactical flexibility instead of simple preponderance of
force; the employment of the minimum force necessary
to avoid alienating the population; and the topic of
this monograph, civil-military integration, which ensures that all elements of the occupation’s power are
focused on the same policy without undermining one
another.10
COIN Operations.
Adapting to their environment, military formations
must disperse in the villages to provide security and
gain knowledge of social dynamics as well as military
intelligence. Every military action has an immediate
political ramification at an intimate level; no longer do
the two realms reside in separate spheres as depicted
in the orthodox American model of warfighting. The
aggressive driving of a squad on patrol, which reduces
the risk of immediate attack by a suicide bomber,
5

may also alienate a community living near the base.
In the future, rather than warning soldiers of recently
planted improvised explosive devices (IEDs), villagers
may remain silent.
Residents expect not only a judicious use of
force from the occupation, but also a significant
improvement in their pre-war living conditions.
This burden of expectations is especially heavy for
a superpower—if the strongest country can quickly
vanquish a tyrant, why does it fail to turn on the lights?
In addition to extending security, often in the same
areas where it is fighting insurgents, the occupation
must fulfill basic humanitarian needs, deliver services,
rehabilitate infrastructure, and instill these capabilities
in the redeveloped state. While specialized military
personnel such as Civil Affairs, Military Police, Special
Forces, and the Corps of Engineers can address these
needs, the American government has civilian agencies
(Department of State, Department of Agriculture
[USDA], U.S. Agency for International Development
[USAID], etc.) whose employees have greater expertise
in these forms of assistance.
As each American agency pursues its share of
COIN, departmental personnel may begin to see their
particular mission in isolation from the overall war
effort. USAID contractors might focus on a needsbased disbursement of assistance, regardless of the
loyalties of the recipient communities. Military units
might focus on capturing a particular cell of insurgents
deeply embedded in a community, ignoring the
implications for delicate political negotiations within
the district government. To avoid these tendencies,
the various agencies of the U.S. Government must not
only coordinate, but must integrate, their programs so
that each complements, rather than undermines, the
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other. To facilitate this integration, the most successful
COIN efforts have had a unified civil-military chain of
command under a single manager.
TODAY’S CHALLENGES IN AFGHANISTAN
The Afghan insurgents do not form a coherent
movement, but rather a mix of Islamist remnants,
warlords, drug runners, and bandits. Motives for
violence vary—some who seek political power may
be co-opted; others simply profit from disorder and
illicit economies and will resist the extension of state
authority; the most radical would redefine justice and
usurp its enforcement. But all seek to diminish popular
confidence in the government of President Hamid
Karzai and enhance their own political power. These
varied interests play out through Afghanistan’s ethnic
heterogeneity and tribal culture, which impede the
development of national unity.
To counter these forces, the occupation must
partner with the underdeveloped forces and ministries
of the Afghan government. The occupation leadership
must carefully calibrate its transfer of power to the
fledgling Afghan government, which may enhance
the legitimacy of the campaign but also decrease
the delivery of services to the populace, as low
capacity, corruption, and inefficiency hamper the new
institutions.
These conditions would challenge any occupation;
the obstacles of combined warfare complicate efforts
in Afghanistan. As American troops are stretched by
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) provides a growing portion of
the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in
Afghanistan. Each member brings its own national
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stipulations,11 as well as varied logistic capabilities.
These differing responses create confusion for Afghan
partners, creating seams which insurgents may exploit.
Coalition difficulties extend to the partnership with
Afghan forces. Since local forces continue to lag their
coalition counterparts in equipment, capability, and
professionalism, the coalition must seriously consider
whether to shift the brunt of security efforts to Afghan
units, which might not be as effective, or continue to
lead the fight at the risk of creating dependency.
Conventional Bias.
In addition to the particular obstacles posed by
Afghanistan and the challenges of coalition warfare,
characteristics of American society, government, and
military have been part of the problem. Recalling the
success of the Gulf War and confident that American
conventional superiority had increased in the decade
following it, the U.S. Government and public felt that
the military, empowered by a revolution in military
affairs (RMA), was suited for wars large and small.
However, the RMA military was the product of lateCold War strategy and doctrine for the defense of
Europe, designed to wreak conventional destruction
of atomic proportions on a Soviet opponent. In the
opening stages of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM,
the technological advantages of stealth, precision, and
battlespace awareness seemed equally applicable to a
small war. In little more than a month, the Americanled coalition expelled the Taliban and its al Qaeda
confederates from Afghanistan’s major cities. Violence
remained at low levels for the next 18 months, and
just as U.S. forces crushed their Iraqi counterparts and
captured Baghdad in 3 weeks, the RMA military again
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demonstrated its power across the combat spectrum.
The U.S. Government continued to indulge its binary
conception of war and peace—as the military had
fought and defeated the enemy, it was now the duty of
the civilian government, international organizations,
and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to
reconstruct the country.
With this confidence, the government and the
military did little to prepare for “insurgency”—
through 2003, the military in Afghanistan did not use
the term in theater, preferring “counterterrorism” for
any fights against violent factions.12 The distinction is
important—generals focused on hunting extremists,
rather than securing the population. As violence has
increased in Afghanistan and Iraq, the military has
begun to recognize the nature of the threat, and altered
its training and doctrine to prepare its soldiers for
COIN. In addition to chasing terrorists and training
native forces, the military has become increasingly involved in reconstruction and securing the population.
Although the military had expected to cede reconstruction to civilian agencies, it has assumed much of
this burden out of necessity. The State Department,
USDA, USAID, Department of Justice, and other
civilian agencies lack the capability to deploy quickly.
Nor are these departments designed to support a
long-term theater presence—after September 11, 2001
(9/11), Congress did not significantly increase their
manning. As peacetime national security structures
proved inadequate for insurgency, an over-militarized
response ensued.
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Provincial Reconstruction Teams.
In part to address theses problems, the U.S.
Government has expanded the civil-military Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) since their
creation in 2002. These teams had a three-fold mission:
(1) to establish security; (2) to extend the writ of
the Kabul government to the provinces; and (3) to
facilitate reconstruction. PRTs collocated soldiers and
civilian personnel on one base to coordinate distinct
departmental programs. By the fall of 2003, four teams
were in the field with eight more in 2004; and 25 today.
A dozen are American, with just under 100 personnel
each; manning on coalition teams varies.13
Nearly everyone on a PRT is uniformed; civilians
include one representative from the State Department,
USAID, and sometimes the USDA. There are also a
few Afghan interpreters and an Afghan Ministry of
Interior official. By consolidating these personnel in
one location, the United States has tried to integrate
the diplomatic, economic, and security responses to
the insurgency.
Despite the rising violence, PRTs have contributed
significantly to Afghanistan’s progress.14 However,
three obstacles have hampered the effectiveness of
the teams. First, civilian participation is low—the
team structure calls for a single representative from
each of three departments, and not every PRT is even
able to fill these three slots. Second, ISAF has too few
teams—25 are inadequate for a country of 600,000
square miles and 30 million people. Finally, the lack
of an integrated military-civil chain of command (even
on the American PRTs, which are free of the demands
of coalition warfare) diminishes the coherence of the
American COIN response. This monograph examines
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diffuse management in Afghanistan, the American
response to a similar problem in Vietnam, the effects
of ambiguous command, and the benefits of unified
authority.
ENDNOTES - SECTION I
1. In 2003, the UN Department of Safety and Security
assessed a few pockets of the region as “high risk.” By 2005,
these had proliferated considerably, and in some cases ratings
deteriorated to “extreme risk.” In the following year, more
districts destabilized, and by June 2006, nearly one-third of the
country was described as either high or extreme risk. The trend
continued in 2007. See “Countering Afghanistan’s Insurgency:
No Quick Fixes,” International Crisis Group—Asia Report No. 123,
November 2, 2006, p. 28.
2. In 2006, the last year with complete data, there were 1,677
attacks with IEDs (up from 783 in 2005), 4,542 armed attacks
(compared to 1,558 the previous year), and 4,000 deaths, the
highest total since 2001. See Seth Jones, “Pakistan’s Dangerous
Game,” Survival, Vol. 49, No. 1, 2007, p. 24. The rate of attacks on
schools doubled, from 110 in the first 6 months of 2006 to over
400 in the 11 months following. See Joanna Wright, “Taliban
Insurgency Shows Signs of Enduring Strength,” Jane’s Intelligence
Review, Vol. 18, No. 10, 2006, pp. 24-31; and “Slide Show: War
Enters the Classroom,” New York Times, available from www.
nytimes.com/pages/world/index.html.
3. In 2002, there was one suicide attack; 2 in 2003; 6 in 2004; and
27 the next year. In 2006, 139 suicide bombers struck, exceeding
the historical total. See Jones, “Pakistan’s Dangerous Game,” p.
24.
4. U.S. forces have fought or assisted local governments
against insurgents in the Philippines (three times), Latin America
(with the Marine Corps in the interwar period), Greece, Vietnam,
Colombia, El Salvador, and Somalia. See Kalev Sepp, “Best
Practices in Counterinsurgency,” Military Review, May-June, 2005,
p. 8.
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5. David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and
Practice, New York: Praeger, 1964, p. 4.
6. The euphoria following the fall of Baghdad in April 2003
reveals the primacy of this American conception of war.
7. For an incisive analysis of this phenomenon during our last
major COIN, see Andrew Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam,
Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, March 1988.
8. Eric V. Larson and Bagdan Savych, American Public Support
for US Military Operations from Mogadishu to Baghdad, Santa
Monica, CA: RAND, 2005, p. 14. For more analysis on American
public support for war, consult Peter D. Feaver and Christopher
Gelpi, Choosing Your Battles: American Civil-Military Relations and
the Use of Force, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004;
and John Mueller, War, Presidents, and Public Opinion, New York:
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1973.
9. Paradoxically, the first two factors in public support
may work against one another. By minimizing perceived costs,
American forces may decrease their chances of success. Consider
a risk-averse strategy which harbors soldiers on large bases, thus
decreasing casualties, while disorder spreads “outside the wire,”
causing the people to lose confidence in the government and
occupation.
10. For more on these components, see John Nagl, Learning to
Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and
Vietnam, Abington, UK: Praeger Publishers, October 2002.
11. Coalition members have different rules of engagement
and combat radii.
12. David Barno in discussion with author, July 18, 2007.
13. Canada, UK, Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Germany,
Norway, Lithuania, Hungary, and New Zealand all lead PRTs.
14. PRTs have contributed to fair elections, a dramatic increase
in education, and improved essential services.
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SECTION II. AFGHANISTAN BY DESIGN
ORIGINS
On December 20, 2001, the United Nations (UN)
Security Council passed Resolution 1386 establishing
ISAF, which the UN tasked with securing Kabul, while
American-led forces conducted counterterrorism
operations in other parts of the country. President
Karzai was pleased with the progress of ISAF in the
capital and hoped to extend its civilian-focused peacekeeping to the provinces. Since ISAF nations were
initially unwilling to provide troops beyond Kabul,
the United States developed the PRTs to stabilize
the provinces.1 The first PRT became operational in
Gardez in November 2002. Within a few months,
teams deployed to Bamian, Konduz, Mazar-i-sharif,
Kandahar, and Herat. The new PRTs expanded the
work of the Army’s Coalition Humanitarian Liaison
Cells and Civil Affairs Teams, and sought to increase
participation of civilian agencies in the new stabilization program. However, an unclear mission, low civilian involvement, and limited resources hampered the
first PRTs.
To strengthen the program, the American Embassy
promulgated a three-part mission for PRTs in February
2003. The teams were to help establish security,
extend the authority of the Kabul government to the
provinces, and assist reconstruction. Through these
goals, the teams would expand the capacity of the
Afghan government while maintaining a low foreign
profile. The Embassy formed a PRT Executive Steering
Committee comprising the heads or senior deputies
of the Ministry of Interior, other Afghan ministries,
UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA),
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Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A),2
and ISAF; however, the Steering Committee did not
have real executive power, as authority over each
team remained with the sponsoring government (still
predominantly American during the program’s early
stages).
In June 2003, the National Security Council
Deputies’ Committee approved the expanded program, as well as the proposed division of labor for
the three primary participating agencies. The Department of Defense (DoD) would improve security in the
area of responsibility (AOR), provide all logistical
support, and provide force protection for all PRT
members, including civilians. The State Department
representative was responsible for political outreach
and reporting. A USAID official took the lead on construction. Together, the three representatives on each
PRT would approve all reconstruction projects and
coordinate them with local Afghan officials.3
Although coalition officials have not established
formal doctrine for the program, several documents
have augmented the guidance of the 2003 Deputies
Committee memo. The PRT Executive Steering
Committee Charter (December 2004), the PRT Terms
of Reference (January 2005), and most recently the PRT
Handbook (with a third edition released earlier this
year), have described guidelines for the teams. The
PRT Handbook, jointly signed by the Commander of
ISAF, the Senior Civilian Representative of NATO, and
the UN Special Representative, maintains the three
original goals of the PRT program, noting that the
PRTs have a special obligation to lead reconstruction in
areas too dangerous for traditional aid organizations.
It also asserts that the Executive Steering Committee
should provide strategic guidance, and describes the
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new command relationship of PRTs within ISAF—for
military matters, they report to and receive support
from the four Regional Commands (RCs). The capital
of each team’s sponsoring nation, however, still
dictates rules of engagement, sets force employment
restrictions, and directs reconstruction programs.
THE CONCEPT
Structure.
The personnel and command structure of each team
vary between nations. The U.S. model comprises a core
of approximately 80 Americans and a few Afghans. The
PRT Commander, until recently, was a Civil Affairs
officer.4 With the help of his staff, he leads the military
contingent, advises local Afghan officials, and hosts
planning meetings with the regional UNAMA office as
well as NGOs. Each PRT has two Civil Affairs sections,
of four soldiers each. One group makes frequent trips
into the province to assess reconstruction projects;
the second runs a Civil-Military Operations Center,
which coordinates programs with other aid actors
in the province. A Police Training and Assessment
Team (three MPs) assists local police forces. The
military contingent also has a psychological operations (psyops) unit, explosive ordnance disposal team,
intelligence cell, medics, aircraft support personnel,
and an administrative and support staff of about 20
soldiers. A platoon of 40 soldiers provides security for
the compound and trips into the countryside.
As envisioned, an American PRT should also have
a State Department Foreign Service Officer (FSO), a
USAID representative, and a USDA expert. The FSO
serves as the political advisor to the PRT Commander,
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the Governor of the province, and other local officials.
Deployed FSOs also report provincial political dynamics to the Embassy. The USAID representative
works closely with the Civil Affairs teams, advises on
all development work, and coordinates projects with
the local government and area NGOs. The Agriculture employee provides veterinary and horticultural
assistance to locals, a critical service given that 80
percent of the population is engaged in farming.
An officer from the Afghan Ministry of Interior
(MOI) advises the PRT on local politics and helps
intelligence efforts. Most PRT commanders found the
MOI’s assistance indispensable.5 Three or four Afghans
serve as interpreters.
Chain of Command.
The PRT Commander is responsible for the care
(food, housing) and logistical support of all team
members. The commander has been until recently a
Civil Affairs officer and thus been assigned command
of only the Civil Affairs team members (who, like
the commander, are often reservists). Other military
elements (force protection, intelligence, psychological
operations, air detachment, etc.) are attached to the
PRT to support its efforts—while they may receive
broad mission guidance from their own chain, the
commander has varying degrees of tasking authority
over these units. While he does not have Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) authority and does
not write evaluations for these personnel, he could
likely remove a miscreant through his influence with
the component chain of command.6
Funding, evaluation, assignment, and programmatic authorities for civilians rest with their parent
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agency in Kabul (although the PRT representatives
retain some autonomy because of their isolation).
USAID and State have different reporting systems.
Deployed FSOs report directly to the State PRT
Office in Kabul. USAID, however, has mirrored the
changes in the military command structure, adding
Development Advisors at the Regional Command
(RC), who supervise programs at the PRT and report
to USAID’s Civil-Military Affairs Office in Kabul.
Collocation is the greatest benefit of the PRT program. Representatives of USAID, State Department,
USDA, and the military bring unique expertise to
the team and, as they learn each other’s perspective,
can jointly develop a program geared towards the
three components of the PRT mission and tailored to
local conditions. A cramped, isolated base fosters a
cooperative spirit, and the focus on a single province
and its particular problems creates a common outlook
among representatives now removed from their parent department. The constant intercourse between the
representatives who live, eat, and socialize together
introduces each to the other’s agency, and allows
access to each department’s resources.
Multiple reporting routes bring some advantages
to the teams. As each department in Kabul has its
own chain to the PRTs, the director and mission staff
receive timely accounts of the local effects of provincial
and national programs. Reciprocally, team members
benefit from their colleagues’ quick access to their
Kabul headquarters. One RC Commander noted that
“if you have the State Department guys tied to State’s
Headquarters, you get a good link to that higher
authority and that expertise.”7 Some respondents
cite the ability to leverage these separate chains of
command; if one representative is having trouble

17

accessing departmental funds, a colleague from a
different department might send word up a second
chain of command, and a meeting by senior officials in
Kabul could free up money.8
The teams rely on several sources of funds to
finance reconstruction projects. The military has
access to Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP)9 and Overseas Humanitarian Disaster
Assistance and Civil Aid (OHDACA). USAID has
contributed Quick Impact Project (QIP) funds, which
focus on small infrastructure improvements, and has
recently transitioned to a new type of funding, the
Local Governance and Community Development
program, designed to increase the capacity of the local
government. The State Department has little money
earmarked directly for projects, since its work on political development is not as expensive as reconstruction.
To coordinate the programs of different departments, a PRT Commander will often develop a system
of regular meetings with other team members as
well as provincial actors. One PRT leader convened
a nightly internal staff meeting with all civilians and
senior personnel of the various military attachments
to review the day’s activities and plan for the next
day. This commander also held a weekly Operations
Synchronization meeting which included the PRT
staff as well as NGO and UN officials.10 Through these
meetings, smoothly functioning teams coordinate
different funding sources to provide continuity to
provincial programs. An officer with PRT experience
noted that teams might start construction of a school
with readily accessible CERP accounts, and then, once
approved, draw on USAID’s Quick Impact Project
funds.11
By using these internal systems which accommodate multiagency representation, most PRTs develop
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a consensus, rather than command, decision process.
Participants note that this cooperative management
style, when functioning well, addresses concerns of
each department. One deployed FSO recounted a
visiting ambassador asking who was in charge. The
team leader responded “There are four of us,” including
the FSO, the USAID representative, and the CO of the
attached infantry battalion. The State representative
praised the leadership climate—“it got to the point
where we were practically of one mind.”12
NATION TEAM
A Shift in Strategy.
As PRTs expanded in late 2003 and increased coordination between civilian agencies and the military
at a tactical level, a new commander of American
forces tried to integrate civil-military operational
efforts at the national level. When then-Major General
David Barno, USA, arrived in October 2003 to lead the
CFC-A, comprising nearly all American forces in the
country, he declined to craft a narrow military mission
statement. Rather, he directed his forces to adopt a
broad mission: make U.S. policy goals—the creation
of a stable, democratic, unified state—succeed in
Afghanistan.13
To accomplish this new mission, he changed the
military’s operational focus. Uttering a word that most
leaders in theater had eschewed, Barno admitted that
an “insurgency” threatened the prospects of American
success in Afghanistan.14 To address this danger, he
directed American forces to shift their efforts from
counterterrorism to COIN. Although counterterrorism
remained important, it would assume a supporting
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role. Following a classic COIN strategy, Barno designated the population and its security, instead of violent
Islamists, as the center of gravity. The new CFC-A
Commander embraced nation-building, a mission
that the previous command had explicitly declined.
He considered PRTs, with their mission of security,
governance, and reconstruction, an apt instrument
for the new population-centric strategy and added
resources to the teams.
The Move to Kabul.
When he took command of forces, Barno felt that
tactical considerations were subsuming operational
goals. To implement his new strategy, he wanted
“to establish Unity of Command and Unity of Effort,
of which we had none.”15 Barno moved his military
headquarters to Kabul in order to create this coherence. Previously, the senior American general resided
on a large combat base at Bagram, while civilian
leaders (Afghan, American, and those of other
nations), UN heads, NGO directors, and the ISAF
contingent quartered in Kabul, about 35 miles away.
General Barno felt that the geographic separation
impeded integration of the military operational
planning with broader American strategy and Afghan
government concerns. Discussing the potential move,
a senior commander warned that “Kabul will consume
you”16—exactly Barno’s intent.
While the top American military and civilian leaders would never achieve unity of command in Afghanistan, the general’s move did facilitate coordination
between the Embassy and his staff. Barno and Zalmay
Khalilzad quickly forged a strong relationship. The
general found that he shared a “common view of the
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fight” with the new Ambassador, who endorsed the
new COIN strategy.17 Acknowledging the primacy of
the political in counterinsurgency, Barno saw himself
as the supporting element on behalf of Khalilzad’s mission. To cement this new partnership and bring together
their respective staffs, the general moved his headquarters into the Embassy; quarters elsewhere in
Kabul, while an improvement on Bagram, were
insufficient. This collocation was of “huge importance”18—easy access no matter the hour and shared
workdays, meals, and recreation, helped to integrate
the policies of the two leaders and their staffs. This
common quartering also signaled to the Afghan
government, subordinates in the field (civilian and
military), and the Washington departments that the
Embassy and military were pursuing a unified strategy. The shared Embassy also allowed Barno to second military planners to the Ambassador’s chronically
undermanned staff.19
Relocating to Kabul helped CFC-A’s international
outreach as well. As he formed a detailed document
describing his new COIN strategy, General Barno
circulated drafts throughout the international
leadership in Kabul, gathering input from all USG
bodies, UNAMA, and the Afghan government.20
Building this consensus partially compensated for the
lack of an international combined command.
Reorganizing the Military.
To clarify the responsibility of military units,
General Barno altered the structure of his field commands. Previously, Combined Joint Task Force 180
(CJTF-180) in Bagram had directed all forces nationwide. Maneuver battalions reported directly to Bag-
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ram, with no fixed area of responsibility. Other military
units worked primarily within their functional chains
of command (e.g., air, logisitics), reporting through
these to Bagram. PRTs reported to the Coalition Joint
Civil-Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF) in
Kabul, which in turn answered to Bagram.
Barno split the country into four regions, assigning
responsibility for all military units within each
region to Regional Commands (RC). His goal was
“to get coherence, ownership of results, by assigning
geographic battlespace to battalions and brigades so
that now units would report to a specific person [the
RC Commander].”21 Barno transferred operational
authority over the PRTs’ military elements22 from CJCMOTF to the RC. He also gutted CJCMOTF over the
objection of many of its Civil Affairs staffers, sending
many personnel to the eight new PRTs deployed in the
first half of 2004.23 The consolidated authority of the
RCs increased the coordination between the sometimes
conflicting operations of maneuver battalions, which
focused on strike missions, and PRTs, which focused
on stabilization. One FSO praised the new structure,
noting that “the PRT commander reports back to this
chain that is now integrated with the warfighting
element and the reconstruction effort element and
that’s good, because it . . . seemed to reduce the
frustrations that poor PRT commander is fighting.”24
The new chain of command effectively separated
operational and administrative control of the PRTs’
military components between the RCs and CJCMOTF,
respectively. One RC Commander surmised that
sensitivity to bureaucratic culture motivated the split
reporting chains—PRT leaders were more comfortable
being rated by a Civil Affairs officer (rather than a
combat arms commander at the RC), most of whom
were attached to CJCMOTF.25
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SECTION III. CIVIL-MILITARY REALITY
The close coordination of the Embassy and CFC-A
and the rapid expansion of PRTs from 2003 to 2005
improved cooperation between the civilians and the
military. However, some hopes of that period have
receded, due in part to the expected complications as
the coalition grows; of greater concern, fundamental
problems in the chain of command, which have never
been addressed, persist.
PROBLEMS AT THE NATIONAL AND REGIONAL
LEVELS
Changes in Kabul.
As coalition participation has increased, ISAF
has expanded its area of responsibility. In 2006, the
American government disbanded CFC-A and ceded
responsibility for all stability and security operations
to ISAF, under NATO command. The alliance includes
37,800 troops deployed in 4 regions (RC East, South,
North, and West) and a capital area.1 Each region has a
1 or 2-star officer who reports to the ISAF commander,
who at this writing was General Dan McNeill, USA.
Roughly 15,000 of ISAF’s soldiers are American, falling
under RC East commanded by Major General David
Rodriguez. These include 1,000 PRT personnel.
An additional 11,000 American Soldiers comprise
OEF2 efforts in Afghanistan. These troops fall under
3 commands: CSTC-A3 is responsible for training and
equipping Afghan security forces; the Joint Special
Operations Task Force leads counterterrorism efforts;
and the National Support Element provides logistics
and administrative support for American troops in the-
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ater. Each of these commands reports to CENTCOM,
although SOCOM shares responsibility for JSOTF.
At the national level, the American Embassy is
not as closely tied to ISAF as it had been to CFC-A.
This change is appropriate; the United States has lost
its unilateral sway in Afghanistan, and ISAF should
coordinate more broadly. However, the separation
between the American command and the Embassy
preceded the turnover to ISAF. When Lieutenant
General Karl Eikenberry took command of CFC-A,
he moved his staff out of the Embassy to a separate
compound in Kabul. With the departure, Eikenberry’s
interactions with the new Ambassador, Ronald
Neumann, decreased as did the integration of their
staffs. Neumann did not object to the departure of
CFC-A Headquarters, and the relationship between
the Ambassador and the new commander was not as
close as that of their predecessors.4
The separation between the Ambassador and the
American military commander had significant effects
in addition to the immediate deterioration of joint
planning. First, coordination looked less important
to the Afghan government, as well as to American
personnel.5 Second, contentious issues such as a border
security plan and a transition of police training from
State Department to DoD, which the Ambassador and
CFC-A commander had previously resolved, were
now referred to Washington.6
The new Ambassador lacked the authority and
clout of Khalilzad, who had served not only as Ambassador but also as Special Presidential Envoy to
Afghanistan, enjoying frequent access to the U.S. VicePresident and President.7 However, the fundamental
ambiguity of the authorities of the Chief of Mission
(CoM) hindered both Ambassadors. State Department,
USAID, and military officials in Afghanistan and
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Washington have different understandings of the
authority of the Chief of Mission.8 Some contend
that the Ambassador’s position as Chief of Mission
bestows a degree of directive power over other civilian
departments. Others claim that he may influence, but
not direct, the programs of different departments.
One senior State Department official observed that
the Ambassador’s executive power depends on the
individual’s personality and the “clout” of the State
Department at that time, adding that “even in the best
run country team which is fully integrated, there is a
certain amount of stovepiping and direct reporting to
the parent office in DC.”9
Even under the Barno-Khalilzad team, the practice
of interagency coordination fell short of the vision.
Barno praised the integrated national view he received by daily exposure to every department’s reporting
chain, noting that his picture was much more complete
than that available to any other military officer.10
The field did not enjoy such smooth coordination.
Information did trickle down, but often circuitously—
an RC Commander noted with no irony that the FSOs
on the PRT:
have a direct link to the ambassador’s office which
has a direct link back to Washington. They were able
to find out at least from my perspective what the
U.S. Government’s intent was for a specific area, but
they were also able to talk to government officials,
get information out of Kabul that the ambassador
was getting from the president and let us know at
least what the central government had planned for
an area.11

A more efficient chain might transmit the information
directly to the RC Commander, instead of requiring
him to depend on a subordinate PRT for an under27

standing of American strategic intent. Worse, whether
shared or not at the national level, plans are sometimes
not extended to the field through any chains. One PRT
commander described an unannounced Department
of State anti-drug operation employing Afghan
commandos, which upset villagers. The governor
demanded, “Can you meet with 300 people that are
upset because they had some military come in and do
this drug bust and nobody knew about it?” The PRT
commander, as uninformed as the provincial officials,
could give no detailed explanation.12
Regional Dynamic for the PRTs.
Although Barno’s system of Regional Commands
strengthened battlespace ownership, it has not given
the Regional Commanders true authority over their
PRTs. National restrictions inhibit cooperation between teams, and diminish the ability of RCs to
direct and integrate operations within their regions.
Additionally, the RC has formal command only over
the military elements on the PRTs (which remain
constrained by national caveats); national missions
in Kabul direct the reconstruction and diplomatic
programs of each team.
Nor has the RC model of area responsibility been
applied to the provincial level—American PRTs retain
responsibility only for the reconstruction within their
province, not for offensive operations executed by
maneuver units. So, while the RC largely controls the
forces in its region (with the important exception of
the embedded civilians on the PRT) in accordance
with national restrictions, the team commander does
not have control over the province. If the team needs
robust assistance for a mission in a more dangerous
part of the province, the PRT commander depends
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on the receptivity of the maneuver element. If he
worries that the strike battalion’s security sweep might
endanger a nascent disarmament deal with a local
warlord, he must appeal to the RC. A State Department
official who worked at a New Zealand PRT noted the
difference—the commander was in charge of the PRT
as well as tactical security patrols, “so if something was
out of whack, he could realign it.”13 An FSO deployed
to an American PRT called for the New Zealand
model—“A single integrated command . . . the attempt
to distinguish between civil affairs and government
support and combat security operations, [being] a false
barrier.”14
Under the current American arrangement,
an appeal to the RC often gains little—the PRT
commander is countering a military culture that still
favors the “kinetic,” finding and engaging bands of
enemy fighters, over mundane stabilization. One
military officer who was stationed at the Embassy and
worked closely with the teams described “bureaucratic resistance from some traditional ground combat
commander personalities,” noting that “I don’t think
in general the conventional force has done well at
learning the lessons of previous deployments as far
as reconstruction goes. I think they were much more
oriented towards the security piece. . . . At particular
points in time, that’s a misplaced priority.”15 One PRT
official noted “that was the only way we could get that
kind of support, if we had a maneuver commander
actually calling it in. There was no way a little PRT was
going to get that. If you have a maneuver commander
who isn’t so tuned in . . . who isn’t that sensitive, then
you’re stuck.”16 A team commander, acknowledging
command bias, suggested total geographic segregation as a solution—“There was a lot of crossing over,
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and that was irritating at times, but, hey, there was
really no way around it because the command would
not change it. I’d put PRTs where you weren’t going
to have other forces.”17 But this drastic solution would
leave the most violent areas without PRTs.
In addition to the cultural tension between tactical and reconstruction missions, PRTs face a deeper
institutional bias. Until recently, Civil Affairs (CA)
officers, many of whom are reservists, commanded
most teams.18 PRT civilians and RC commanders alike
note that CA officers are well-suited for the team’s
complex mission.19 However, Soldiers from traditional
combat arms, such as Armor and Infantry, sometimes
consider Civil Affairs a support unit, its members
not quite full warriors. A PRT member described the
tension:
The Army Civil Affairs people sort of bristle when
they are treated as people who have to be protected.
They will tell you, “We’re Special Forces. We are
Airborne trained. We’re all Soldiers. We’re all
trained. We’re all armed. We protect ourselves, thank
you very much. We’re not orphan children who
have to be shepherded by Army infantry.” They take
pride in the fact that they are Army and they can
protect themselves. Just because they’re Civil Affairs
doesn’t mean that they’re not Soldiers. The maneuver
companies have a rather different perspective. They
tend to think of the PRTs more as sort of civilianized
entities and not “real” Soldiers.20

A State representative echoed this assessment, commenting that the “PRT commander has to be aware of
this—and if he’s a CA guy, he’ll know this anyway—
they can be viewed as the red-headed step children of
the military brethren.”21 Even though RC commanders
recognize the skill of Civil Affairs personnel in leading
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PRTs, they often succumb to the combat arms bias. An
FSO noted that:
The big problem was with the maneuver element.
Almost every PRT and maneuver element share an
AO. The PRT should be the supported element, but
no brigade commander would tell an active Army
commander that he supports a Civil Affairs reservist,
so he either defaulted to the maneuver element or
told the two to work it out.22

When the team and maneuver element commanders
“work it out,” the former will often defer to the latter,
who has the coveted position of battalion commander
in a military that prioritizes tactical strike. Few
maneuver leaders will submit themselves to the tacit
control of the PRT.
The combination of cultural bias for kinetic
operations and against Civil Affairs units leads
maneuver units to dominate teams in some regions.
An FSO described the effects of collocation with a
maneuver element on one team—“Force protection
for the PRT is somewhere down on the list of their
priorities and missions and duties and responsibilities,
towards the bottom third. So, what were PRTs have
now become sort of enhanced civil affairs sections of
combat maneuver companies.”23 Another civilian,
lamenting that teams “did not have adequate commochains back to the actual warfighters,” noted that the
PRTs often “were on the lowest priority peg for any
kind of support.”24 A USAID officer recalled that the
PRT Force Protection unit would often be assigned auxiliary security tasks, stripping him of his escort and
causing him to cancel missions.25 During a period
when the RC commander tasked the team’s force
protection component to undertake a tactical mission,
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a USDA representative complained that the average
number of sorties for reconstruction tasks dropped
from 4-5 per day to 1-2 per day.26
INTRA-PRT DYNAMICS
Lack of Guidance and Uncertain Command.
A 2006 Interagency Assessment charged that the
“lack of operating guidance clearly delineating missions, roles, responsibilities, and authorities,” causes
civil-military tension within the PRTs.27 For example,
the new PRT Handbook is descriptive, not prescriptive; while it outlines organizational relationships with
the RC and Executive Steering Committee, the guide
notes that internal organization is determined by
the sponsoring nation. But the United States still has
not formalized the command structure for its team.
Members devote much energy to negotiating responsibilities, leaving performance dependent on the particular dynamics of the PRT staff.28
Who’s in charge? The answer depends on the
respondent. Although senior military officers recognize that civilians have separate reporting chains, they
are confident that the PRT commander has de facto
control over the team, and that this system works
harmoniously. An RC Commander noted that:
civilians worked for the PRT commander just like the
military guys did . . . guidance and direction came
from the PRT commander. We didn’t have guidance
and direction from a State guy [in Kabul] to a State
guy, from USAID to USAID. Rather, the guy who
owned the battlespace, the RC commander, gave
marching orders and everyone got on board.29
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General Barno gave a similar assessment, noting
that the “commander of the PRT gave guidance and
direction to civilian players, although the civilian
players also reported up to the mission . . . I never had
DoS or USAID disputes; their reps understood that
PRT commanders owned that area and that civilians
operated under PRT commander rules.”30
Most USAID and State representatives recognize
the tendency of the military to arrogate power, but
maintain that they are under the authority of the military for force protection only. One USAID representative stressed her agency’s autonomy, noting that the
national director instructed program officers deployed
to PRTs to consider themselves an independent
USAID Field Office. Describing the declaration in
the 2007 edition of the PRT Handbook that all senior
military and civilian personnel on PRTs are coequals,
she added that civilian PRT representatives received
the grade of GS-13/14 primarily to establish their
parity with the O-5 military commander. In this egalitarian spirit, she no longer uses the term “PRT commander,” but instead refers to the “military lead.” However, she admitted that few used her new lexicon. 31
State Department representatives recall a different
theoretical model for the teams, but concede its neglect.
A 2004 National Security Council Deputies Committee
Memo urged consensus but gave State decisionmaking
primacy in all PRT reconstruction issues;32 however,
“neither military nor civilian colleagues put any
weight on or even knew of the memo.”33 With reality
falling short of the model, State representatives want
at least to maintain autonomy. A Foreign Service
Officer recounted that when he arrived at the two
PRTs where he served, the military commander would
say “you’re my POLAD [political advisor], you’re my
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DoS Representative” to which he would demur “I
work with you, not for you.”34
With regard to specific projects, decisionmaking
depends on the dynamics of the individual teams.
Some veterans describe a leadership council; others
portray complete delegation by the PRT commander
(interestingly, the concept of delegation implies that
the authority originally resides with the colonel); a few
recall a military bent for programmatic decisions. With
this range of command dynamics, a representative
does not know what to expect when he reports to the
team, whether he will have to defend his role from
encroachment or stir counterparts to action. Within
the team, bureaucratic loyalties usually persist—one
USAID officer reflected, “It would have been more
useful to have a more close-knit organization where
you looked at the functions more than you looked
at the place the person came from.”35 This parochialism diffuses responsibility, as representatives blame
difficulties on inadequate assistance from their
colleagues, with the military the most frequent
scapegoat.
Although tension often arises over civil-military
lines, USAID and State representatives also disagree
about programs and resources. The USAID Administrator nominally reports to the Secretary of State,
but USAID employees in the field maintain their
independence. An RC commander noted that “AID
guys are great, but say ‘My mission is development.
I work for USAID, and my parent HQ is in Kabul.’
So there is still stovepiping going on. . . . USAID
employees absolutely see themselves as independent
of State.”36 One State representative working on a
multiagency team in Iraq was shocked to hear a
USAID representative declare in a meeting with local
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officials that he, the USAID individual, was “not a
representative of the U.S. Government.” The State
representative said this is an extreme example of
USAID’s traditional “We do things on a needs basis”
approach that is gradually aligning with national
security concerns.37
Cult of Personality.
When asked whether the ambiguous command
structure is effective, PRT members, operational
leaders, and officials in Washington invariably respond that performance depends on personalities.
“The bottom line is that everything is ad hoc. If you
have the right personalities, it works great; if not,
everyone goes separate ways.”38 With no formal
interagency integration and thus no on-site command,
individual motivation determines PRT performance.
An FSO exclaimed, “[H]ere’s the thing, the State
Department person can just sit there in his office and
pretty much collect his pay, like a consumer of food .
. . but you also have the capacity to really help your
military colleagues a lot.”39 A USAID officer maintained
that “people who cared, worked wonderfully; those
who just wanted a paycheck didn’t care.”40 The
Interagency Assessment captured these concerns in its
surveys, noting that performance is too dependent on
interpersonal dynamics and individuals’ appreciation
of the mission.41
What happens when personalities don’t match?
“Problems,” replies an RC Commander.42 Complaints
from the military and USAID rise up to the RC
level; but due to the flat State chain, the issue might
simultaneously rise to the mission in Kabul. An FSO
tells of a USAID colleague who condemned the PRT
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mission statement as inadequate and refused to fund
any projects. Upon appeal to a supervisor at the State
PRT Office in Kabul, “the response was ‘no surprise.’
I’m not sure if he actually spoke to his USAID
counterpart.”43
The Difficulty of Distant Command.
How was it possible that one of the key members
of the PRT team could simply opt out? “It was the
same for her, for me, for everyone—if she didn’t
report something, it was invisible. . . . She created
the situation, but she wouldn’t have to report it that
way.”44 Each departmental mission in Kabul has
one formal information link from the province—its
representative. Few officers will condemn themselves
to their seniors. When a dispute arises, each mission
receives an account from its representative; these
probably vary, and each department tends to support
its deployed personnel.
Continuing, the FSO describes the dynamic in
Kabul:
The senior directors that we have both appealed to are
at the Embassy; they see each other all the time, eat
together, exercise together. So, if they piss someone
off at the Embassy compound, repercussions last for
weeks. They don’t want to make waves in the capital.
If they piss off someone in the PRT [by ignoring the
appeal from the field], what is that person going to
do? Send an email? Ooooh!45

The distance of the arbitrating body leads not to
resolution, but inaction.
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Military Dominance.
The military officer is usually the most influential
team member due to preponderance of resources as
well as seniority. The PRT commander is responsible
for housing, food, and logistical support for all members—control of these resources provides soft influence. Additionally, the team commander approves
sorties from the base and decides the priority of
trips. Although always striving for consensus, a PRT
commander notes that “if we have to cut one move, I
make the call. Civilians accepted if a move got cut as
well as military guys. Sometimes we have to make a
decision and they might not like it, but so be it. It’s not
based on who is wearing a uniform but rather what
was the effect.”46 Approval of moves strengthens the
PRT commander’s authority in the uneasy balance
of power. Finally, the team leader exerts influence
through the military’s control of the most easily accessible funding, CERP. A State official mused that “AID
may have ‘the lead’ on development, but who’s signing the CERP [military authorized funding] check?”47
The commander’s seniority also inspires deference.
Lacking the deployable capacity of the military, the
State Department and USAID have trouble filling
PRT billets and often rely on younger employees or
contractors. PRT commanders are lieutenant colonels
or colonels with 2 decades of service. A Defense official
observes that “technically, the State person is supposed
to be in charge of political affairs. But State can only get
a junior FSO out there. A lieutenant colonel won’t take
orders from a 30-year-old who has never been in the
field before. . . . So what tends to happen is the military
commander is the commander for the whole PRT.”48
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The 2006 Interagency Assessment describes the
military dominance of some teams, especially on those
that host maneuver elements, and notes the tendency
for some PRT commanders to consider the attached
civilians mere advisors. When civilians are excluded
from decisionmaking, the mission suffers.49 One
USAID representative, worried that the military
mission of the PRT too often took priority over development, saw segregation, rather than integration,
as the solution and suggested dividing the security
and development responsibility between different
PRTs.50
PRTs face two sets of obstacles—military bias
against the team mission and poor organizational
dynamics. A conventional outlook leads sympathetic
Regional Commanders to favor maneuver elements
over PRTs. Lack of clear command and control makes
authority uncertain within the team, performance
overly dependent on personality, and supervision
too distant to be effective. Combined, these problems
lead to an over-militarized response to insurgency.
A unified authority would overcome these obstacles,
improving our COIN efforts in Afghanistan.
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SECTION IV. ANTECEDENTS FROM VIETNAM
Forty years ago, American officials also had
difficulty integrating the government’s response
to insurgency. In 1967, after several years of failed
attempts, the Johnson administration implemented
the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program, which formally
combined the command chains of every department
involved in the COIN effort. This structure created
a unified response from the programs of the various
depart-ments and substantially improved pacification.1
By 1971, the insurgency had withered.
A LONG ROAD
Focus on Counterinsurgency.
Early in the Kennedy administration, officials
recognized the primacy of COIN. Frustrated with
the extremes of inaction versus nuclear strike offered
by Eisenhower’s doctrine of Massive Retaliation,
the new President promulgated Flexible Response,
which proposed to meet the nation’s threats through
graduated force. As wars of national liberation raged,
Kennedy instructed the government to prepare for
COIN. Encouraging the future Army to embrace
these new responsibilities, the President urged the
graduating West Point class of 1962 to be ready for
a type of war against guerrillas who see “victory by
eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging
him. . . . It requires in those situations where we must
counter it . . . a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly
different kind of force, and therefore a new and
wholly different kind of military training.”2 He
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recognized that since the mid-1950s, Army advisers
had tried to form the South Vietnamese Army
(ARVN) in the image of the American force—a
mechanized, conventional army, trained for interstate
conflict, not COIN.
Kennedy anticipated bureaucratic resistance, stating, “I know that the Army is not going to develop
this counterinsurgency field and do the things that I
think must be done unless the Army itself wants to
do it.”3 While the Army publicly embraced COIN, it
made few changes in its training to incorporate the
new doctrine. Realizing the broad demands of this
unconventional warfare, the administration also
directed civilian agencies to embrace COIN. It initiated an interdepartmental seminar for the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), State Department, and
military, and created a Special Group for Counter
Insurgency to draft an interagency approach to COIN.
However, the rest of the government was no more
inclined to innovate than the military.
Failure to Change.
The President hoped that the adoption of COIN
doctrine by the U.S. Government would enhance
pacification efforts in Vietnam, and several civilian
agencies joined the military in assisting the Saigon
government, which was competing with the Viet Cong
for legitimacy. Communist insurgents provided health
care, schooling, land reform, and infrastructure in the
villages they controlled.
Eisenhower’s Executive Order 10575 of 1954 had
established the Country Team, formally placing
the Ambassador in charge of all civilian agencies in
Vietnam. However, the different agencies guarded
their independence—USAID, USIA, and the CIA each
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had a larger staff than the Ambassador and looked
back to Washington, rather than to the Embassy,
for direction and funding authorization. Every
department had its own idea of how to run the war,
influenced by different responsibilities and funding
set by Congress. While the successive Ambassadors
technically had veto power over these departments,
none exercised it, so there was no unified direction
for the COIN campaign. Nor was there one person or
agency stateside responsible for pacification—below
the President, “everybody and nobody was responsible
for coping with it in the round.”4 With no single leader
or organization accountable, the campaign adopted
the attributes of the goliath, becoming overmilitarized.
To overcome bureaucratic resistance, President
Lyndon Johnson tapped respected retired Army
General Maxwell Taylor as his new Ambassador in
1964. The new President granted Taylor proconsular
powers over all American personnel in the country,
directing “that this overall responsibility includes
the whole U.S. military effort in South Vietnam
and authorizes the degree of command and control
that you consider appropriate.”5 Taylor formed the
Mission Council, a regular meeting of the heads of
all the agencies and the military in Saigon. Although
the council improved information flow, it could not
impose a unified response as the Ambassador allowed
each agency to appeal decisions to its Washington
headquarters. Taylor also faced resistance from the new
military commander, General William Westmoreland,
who felt that efforts by the State Department to
direct him regarding strategic matters violated “the
prerogatives of the military commander.”6 The new
Ambassador was unwilling to put Westmoreland
“in the unhappy position of having two military
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masters”7—himself and the Commander in Chief of
Pacific forces.
A year into Taylor’s tenure, little had changed.
There were now 60 poorly integrated programs under
the U.S. mission. Senior officials in Saigon still looked
to their departments in Washington for direction, and
personnel in the provinces established independent
offices with no unified chain of command. Complicating matters, deployed representatives received conflicting directives from Saigon and the United States.
As civilian agencies pursued their own programs,
the military dramatically increased its ground
presence in 1965. Under Westmoreland, American
forces shifted away from efforts to build up the
government of South Vietnam (GVN) and ARVN and
instead assumed the primary combat role, engaging
the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and the Viet Cong
(VC) in large-scale operations. The Army commenced
its Search and Destroy tactics, embracing firepower
and attrition rather than intelligence and population
security to defeat the insurgents. Late in the year,
Henry Cabot Lodge replaced Taylor, and reiterated
Johnson’s focus on pacification but did little to
advance civil-military integration—in a January 1966
conference with senior Washington officials, Lodge
and the other departmental directors from Saigon
expressed confidence in command arrangements,
and urged policymakers to maintain separate lines
of communication back to individual departments in
Washington. The conference produced no agreement
on how to improve pacification and reminded political
leaders that any major reorganization would wallow
without presidential intervention.8
A month later, Johnson instructed the Saigon
mission to produce goals and deadlines for its
pacification plans. Meanwhile, other administration
46

officials called for a single director of pacification.
Heeding this advice, Johnson directed Deputy Chief
of Mission William Porter to lead all pacification efforts, to the chagrin of Lodge. However, Porter did not
embrace his new power, and saw the job primarily as
a coordination effort. He noted that he had no desire
“to get into the middle of individual agency activities
and responsibilities,” and sought “to suggest rather
than criticize.”9 Washington proved no more receptive
to presidential direction, as departments resisted the
administration’s major initiatives throughout 1966.10
Nor did the military subscribe to the new COIN
emphasis; generals in Washington and Saigon ignored
the PROVN study,11 which recommended that the
Army shift its focus from conventional operations to a
new pacification campaign directed by a unified chain
reaching from a single head in Washington down as
far as the district level.
The Arrival of Komer.
In March 1966, Johnson appointed Robert Komer
as Special Assistant to the President for Affairs in
Vietnam, granting authority to supervise and direct
all U.S. nonmilitary pacification programs from
Washington. The gruff “Blowtorch Bob,” formerly a
presidential aide, was intolerant of bureaucratic inertia,
an attitude which would help him force departmental
integration. In the meantime, the military centralized
its COIN efforts under the Revolutionary Development
Support program to encourage lower levels to focus
on pacification. In a limited reprise of his 1964 edict
to Taylor, Johnson gave Lodge authority to “exercise
full responsibility” over the advisory effort—this time,
the Army’s main battle units would remain independent.12 Although Westmoreland cooperated, the dis47

parate civilian agencies and the military were unable
to coordinate effectively.
Frustrated with the lack of progress, in August
1966, Komer suggested three possible structures
to reinvigorate pacification efforts, with varying
models of intercivilian and civil-military integration.
The civilian agencies rejected the plans, offering no
alternatives. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara proposed consolidating all pacification personnel and
programs under Military Assistance CommandVietnam (MACV),13 with a deputy for pacification in
charge; only Komer and the Joint Staff endorsed this,
as other departments again demurred, though this
time they offered counterproposals. USAID preferred
a structure of multiagency committees at each level of
the chain, creating coordination but not true integration. Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach
offered yet another conservative alternative which
maintained separate military and civilian chains of
command.
McNamara summarized the frustration of reform
advocates—“from the point of view of the important
war (for the [support] of the people)—no better, and
if anything worse off.”14 He continued that “[w]e have
known this from the beginning. But the discouraging
truth is that, as was the case in 1961 and 1963 and
1965, we have not found the formula, the catalyst for
training and inspiring [the Vietnamese] into effective
action.”15
As a compromise short of civil-military integration,
Johnson directed the establishment of the Office of
Civil Operations (OCO) in November 1966. Over the
objections of the agencies, this combined all civilian
pacification operations under one chain of command
reporting to the Deputy Chief of Mission; military
COIN efforts remained separate. Significantly, OCO
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consolidated all civilian field personnel in multiagency
compounds, which provided their MACV and South
Vietnamese counterparts with a single point of contact.
The OCO chain wrote performance evaluations for its
personnel, though the parent agency added comments.
Pay and administrative support, however, remained
with an individual’s parent agency, as did funding,
which meant that OCO was unable to redistribute
funds along functional lines.
Johnson gave OCO about 4 months to prove its
effectiveness. The organization fell short, showing
little progress against the VC. With no integration into
the military chain of command, the new institution
could not enlist the vast resources of MACV.
Komer noted that the peacetime approach of
the deployed departments to funding, resources,
and personnel was insufficiently flexible to meet the
demands of COIN.16 The lack of unified management
(notwithstanding OCO’s recent but short-lived attempt to unify civilian efforts) hampered the American
response to the insurgency since an orthodox
bureaucracy pursued multiple plans detached from
the Vietnamese government. Poorly coordinated
U.S.-GVN efforts inhibited the development of the
Vietnamese government and military; in its stead,
MACV took over the war, which undermined local
ownership.
CORDS—“CAN OCO REALLY DO
SOMETHING?”17
Civil-Military Integration, At Last.
Dissatisfied by OCO’s inability to produce quick
results, President Johnson signed National Security
Action Memo 362 on May 9, 1967, which declared that
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all pacification efforts would fall under MACV, to be
implemented by a civilian deputy with the rank of
Ambassador.18 To fill this role, Robert Komer would
depart for Vietnam to direct the Civil Operations
and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS)19
program. Komer served Westmoreland not as an adviser or a coordinator, but as a component commander with all that position’s requisite authorities. As
Khalilzad’s close relationship with the White House
increased his influence in Kabul, CORDS benefited
from Johnson’s well-known confidence in Komer.
The combined organization sought to integrate the
civilian and military pacification efforts. Previously,
the military had neglected pacification, contending
that it was primarily a civilian responsibility. However, the military controlled most of the resources
and forces. Johnson and Komer felt that pacification
was too large a task for civilian agencies to handle
alone, and that the effort was failing in large part
because of poor population security, which could
be improved only if responsibility was assigned to
the military. Furthermore, they maintained that the
tasks of COIN required departmental integration so
tight that traditional government cooperation would
be insufficient. By combining all programs under the
military but with a civilian leader, CORDS created a
“unique, hybrid civil-military structure which imposed unified single management on all the diffuse
U.S. pacification support programs and provided a
single channel of advice at each level to GVN
counterparts.”20 Komer praised new Ambassador
Ellsworth Bunker for overcoming resistance from
civilians who resented subordination to the military,
and for pressuring Army leaders who did not want
responsibility for “the other war.”21
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In the new structure, Komer reported to Westmoreland as a 3-star equivalent. For the first time in
the war, a single person commanded all soldiers and
civilians involved in COIN. This arrangement was
unusual—it was rare for civilians to operate within a
military chain of command, and Komer was the first
official of ambassadorial rank to serve under a military
superior and have command of military personnel.22 In
addition to the benefits of unity of command, Komer
envisioned the new organization as a way to give the
military portion of pacification a civilian bent and
interagency access to military resources.
Komer took several steps to reduce civilian discomfort with the apparent military take-over. First, he
depicted the merger as one in which OCO absorbed
the military program Revolutionary Development
Support (RDS), and ensured that the new acronym
began with the word “Civil.” Additionally, to stem
resignations, he emphasized the new opportunities
for leadership now open to civilians. Bureaucratically,
he ensured that his own CORDS staff within
COMUSMACV was not simply advisory, but rather
an operational group with command authority; the
staff also gave CORDS considerable planning capacity. Finally, he expected and received the prerogatives
of a 3-star officer, which in turn conferred legitimacy
upon the program.23
CORDS took control of all civilians involved in
pacification, including personnel from State, USAID,
CIA, USIA, the White House, and the military services.
Civilian and uniformed personnel were interspersed
throughout the new chain of command, with military
reporting to civilian, and vice versa. Komer based
hiring for the organization’s new positions on capability, considering those in and out of uniform.24

51

Vertical Organization.25
Under Komer, regional deputies for CORDS
(DEPCORDS) served in each of the four Corps
headquarters, with the same relationship to the Corps
commander that Komer held with Westmoreland.
The regional deputies, usually civilians, received a
2-star equivalent rank, and served not as advisors
to the Corps commander, but rather as a component
commander, with access to the Corps resources.
Guided by tasking similar to Komer’s, DEPCORDS
were responsible for all pacification operations,
“supervising the formulation and execution of all
military and civilian plans, policies, and programs” in
the region.26 On pacification matters, Komer insisted
that DEPCORDS report straight to him, which suited
the Corps Commanders who preferred to concentrate
on the conventional war.27 The four regional deputies28
directed the provincial teams within their areas.
A Provincial Senior Advisor (PSA) led each of
the 44 province teams. The DEPCORDS, with the
approval of Komer and Westmoreland, appointed
each advisor within his region, ensuring that the high
command of CORDS closely controlled personnel
selection. Roughly half the PSAs were civilian with
military deputies (DPSA); uniformed Provincial Senior
Advisors had civilian deputies. The PSA was in charge
of all pacification in the province, including American
military advisors attached to local Vietnamese militia
(the Regular Forces and Popular Forces [RF/PFs],
Revolutionary Cadre, and the Home Guard). By
detaching militia advisors from their counterparts
who supported ARVN conventional forces, CORDS
freed them from the influence of orthodox tactics. This
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move also enabled the local militia to concentrate on
securing the population rather than supporting the
ARVN. To implement his programs, the PSA worked
closely with the Province Chief, usually a colonel in
the South Vietnamese military. The Province Chief
supervised the provincial government and militia, as
well as the local constabulary forces, the RF/PF.29
Every province had several district teams, each
reporting to its PSA. The teams advised the District
Chief, a Vietnamese official in charge of the RF/PF and
the Revolutionary Development Cadre, on pacification
and development. The country was covered by 250
district teams (see Appendix 3 for map with districts
and provinces).
The new structure survived some initial bureaucratic challenges. Corps commanders objected to
elements of the reorganization, but Westmoreland
supported the CORDS chief—although the commanding general’s search and destroy methods had
been part of the problem, he did not impede this
solution. In Washington, USAID officials preferred
to use their own Saigon channels rather than CORDS
for pacification matters. The USAID Administrator
appealed to Under Secretary of State Katzenbach to
remove the agency’s programs from CORDS, but
Komer successfully countered that basing the pacification structure on administrative lines to Washington
had impeded the necessary civil-military unity.30
Team Structure.
About 100-125 personnel lived on a provincial
CORDS compound. Serving alongside 100 soldiers,
12 civilians assisted in providing security, aviation
support, administration, communications, logistics,
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and advising. Under the PSA and DPSA, an Executive
Officer managed personnel. The team was divided
along functional lines—most provinces had New Life
Development (NLD), Public Safety (police training),
Refugees, Psychological Operations (psyops), and
Chieu Hoi.31 An NLD Chief ran all USAID programs,
including community development and agricultural
assistance, with the help of two or three field assistants. An American police officer or soldier would
serve as Public Safety Advisor. The military usually
staffed administrative positions and psyops. Medics
were military or civilian.
Each district team, comprising four or five officers
and NCOs (and, in calmer districts, civilians), reported
to the provincial team. The district teams lived on the
District Chief’s headquarters compound and worked
closely with the RF/PF and Revolutionary Development Cadre. The RF/PF, a local militia, provided
security for villages and hamlets. The Revolutionary
Development Cadre combined development and security, with tasks varying from building schools to
attacking VC infrastructure (through identification, coopting, capture, and offensive operations). Including
district teams, the PSA was responsible for 140-170
personnel.
ASSESSMENT BY PARTICIPANTS
Chain of Command.
Unity of command was complete and effective
throughout the new pacification organization, with
CORDS seniors accountable for the performance of
their geographic areas and granted authority over
subordinates, no matter the individuals’ parent
agency. Below the Corps, the PSA “ran the show,”32
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with members of the province and district teams
unambiguously under his command. The DPSA
served below the PSA and was responsible for many
of the daily operations. All personnel reported to the
DPSA, most through the Executive Officer (XO) and
the New Life Development Chief. A uniformed XO
was responsible for the soldiers performing support
functions; the NLD Chief managed all development
personnel. A civilian DPSA described the command
system—“I had the exact same level of command over
civilians as military.”33 He noted that when CORDS
began, there was a difficult adjustment period, citing
two examples. His military deputy (the XO), a West
Pointer and Ph.D. 10 years his senior, was initially
uncomfortable with the arrangement, but “came to
understand that I was a bit smarter than he in what we
were actually doing [pacification].”34 One level lower,
a district advisor (who also reported to the DPSA)
contended that civilians should not exert command
over the military except at the level of the Secretary of
Defense, but eventually accepted the deputy advisor’s
new authority.
The integration of operational control led to
intimate involvement by each community in the
other’s activities. A USAID representative who
served as Deputy PSA appeared unannounced in the
districts to monitor the night patrols of the advisory
teams. Although all members of his five districts were
military, he noted that they respected the chain of
command, and approached him for support as well
as directives.35 Another DPSA, armed with an M-1
carbine but no prior military experience, joined district
teams on night patrols and ambushes. As “the senior
leadership, I wanted to see what was happening.”36 By
most accounts, the PSA’s unity of command produced
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tight provincial teams. A refugee advisor noted that
“in no uncertain terms, the military and the civilians
realized that they worked for one man, and as a result
of this, I think everybody was working on the same
team. Everybody got along very well.”37
Rating authority was also shifted from the parent
agency to the provincial team. The PSA wrote the
DPSA’s evaluation and endorsed those of the leadership team; the DPSA (a civilian if his senior was
military, and vice versa) in turn wrote the evaluations
of the district advisors, the XO, and the NLD chief, and
endorsed the evaluations of these leaders’ subordinates.
Performance in the Field.
CORDS generally earned high marks for improved
efficacy relative to its antecedents. A USAID participant
noted that the new program was better structured, with
programs more responsive to the economic needs of
the people. After continual changes to strategic plans
in an earlier civilian-only program, he complained to
Saigon, “Why don’t you settle on a plan and we can give
it a chance to work?” CORDS worked “much, much
better.”38 He praised the increased access to resources,
particularly at the Corps level, noting that previous
programs had no levels of support between the field
and Saigon. Another CORDS participant described the
local flexibility of the program, noting that Komer’s
staff specified only the chain of command, certain
functional sections, and a presence at the district level,
but left subordinates free to adjust the organization
to the circumstances. He also praised the quickened
response time, noting that the integration of the new
organization at the local level allowed redevelopment
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to commence immediately after the militia had cleared
a village of VC.39
The unified chain of command fulfilled Komer’s
vision of a pacification campaign marked by civilian
tone and fueled by military might. A USAID DPSA
reflected, “We all wanted to win the war. But most
civilians thought the military didn’t know how to win.
We were concerned that the civilian program would
be submerged—that didn’t happen. In many ways,
the civilian side was enhanced because they now had
military guys who had skills that they wanted to be
used.”40 One PSA described the resource difference
as an order of magnitude, noting that OCO personnel
who previously had a dozen trucks at the provincial
level now had access to hundreds of vehicles from a
division; when organizing working parties for skillintensive jobs, instead of dozens of men available to
OCO, CORDS could now access entire battalions. He
continued, “That’s one of the great things that came,
I think, out of CORDS. Now those who were in civil
planning-type jobs could feel much more free about
demanding, not just asking or begging for—but
demanding military resources and expect to have them
made available to them.”41
Problems.
The most frequent complaints described onerous
new reporting requirements which detracted from
field work,42 although one participant appreciated
the elimination of dual reporting to OCO and MACV
chains.43 Others objected to the militarization of
USAID programs44 or to the consolidation of power on
the civilian side of the program.45 Some noted strain
between the civilians and uniformed in the new chain
of command.46 Finally, several observed the tension
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between USAID personnel assigned to Saigon and
those deployed with CORDS. A USAID officer in
Saigon described the difficult coordination between
long-term national programs run from the capital
and local programs delegated to CORDS.47 Those in
the field concurred—a CORDS Rural Development
Officer contended, “One does not advise the other
as to what they are doing. In other words, how can a
person in CORDS create what I call lasting institutions
when they have no idea what the long-range economic
planning is at the Saigon level, so rather than working
parallel to one another they work perpendicular to
one another.”48 He concluded that conflicting local and
national programs impeded CORDS’s cooperation
with the local government.
EFFECTS AND EVALUATION
Results.
CORDS fundamentally changed the American
and Vietnamese approach to the insurgency. The
new organization made the military accountable for
pacification, eliminating prior ambiguities which
had let generals claim that COIN was primarily the
responsibility of civilian departments. MACV’s list of
priorities reflected the new emphasis, as pacification
rose from seventh to second of seven major goals.49
The unified approach to COIN bestowed prestige on
the American and South Vietnamese efforts as phrases such as “non-military actions” and “the other war”
fell from the theater lexicon.50
More importantly, vast military resources revitalized local defense forces through arms, training,
and intelligence. Improvements in rural administration, economic conditions, land reform, health, and
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infrastructure bolstered the local government. The
budget for pacification nearly tripled between 1966
and 1970, from $582 million to $1.5 billion (with most
of the increase from Defense funding), while conventional American units were withdrawing. This increased spending allowed a large increase in personnel. In
1966, the United States had 1,000 personnel assigned
to pacification; by 1969, there were 7,600, including
1,200 civilians51 (today, there are 50 in Afghanistan). In
1965, there were fewer than 100 USAID advisors; at the
peak of CORDS, there were 100 agricultural advisors
alone.52
CORDS capitalized on huge VC losses during the
Tet offensive, its expansion of funding, and personnel
who were directed by a unified chain of command, all
effectively drained the insurgency. In early 1968, 59
percent of South Vietnamese lived in secure villages.
By 1971, the figure increased to 96 percent, with most
of the gains in the rural districts that had been the
core of the insurgency.53 The program achieved these
results through the fundamental tenets of COIN,
training 900,000 security and government personnel,
including 300,000 civil servants.54 These efforts created
a viable local administration which provided adequate
security and effective services, displacing the shadow
VC regime that had subverted the state in much of
the countryside. Sapped of popular support, the Viet
Cong presence declined dramatically between 1967
and 1971.55 Assessing the insurgency’s decline, a VC
colonel reflected that “[l]ast year we could attack
United States forces. This year we find it difficult to
attack even puppet forces. . . . We failed to win the
support of the people and keep them from moving
back to enemy controlled areas.”56

59

Finale.
While CORDS suppressed the insurgency, the
ARVN increased its capacity. As the VC lost power,
CORDS shrank from 1970 to 1972. Having largely
achieved its goal, the organization lost primacy as
individual departments regained control over their
traditional sphere of influences; by early 1973, CORDS
was disbanded. In 1972, with the help of American air
power and logistical might but no U.S. ground forces,
the ARVN had repelled an NVA conventional invasion.
But soon the patience of the American public expired,
and Congress forbade any further military assistance to
the South Vietnamese government. Komer concluded
that “[t]he war ended as the American military had
thought it would begin”57—the insurgency having
failed, the North turned to a conventional strategy,
exploiting the American departure. Hanoi violated
the peace accords, and the ARVN, with no American
assistance, yielded to the NVA’s second attempt.
Saigon fell to the communist conventional army in
1975.
Komer maintained that if pacification had been
reformed earlier in the war, victory would have been
more likely, though not certain.58 Unity of command
was only one of three improvements enabled by
CORDS—the program also increased the scale of
pacification and promoted a civilian tone. However,
unified command facilitated the latter two. Without
responsibility for pacification, MACV would not
have increased its contribution; and without a unified
chain, with management delegated to a nonmilitary
head, civilians would have had little influence on the
military’s COIN efforts.
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Why the delay in adopting an effective COIN
strategy? Pacification received presidential attention
as early as the Kennedy administration—Komer
describes “the striking contrast between the amount
of policy stress on counterinsurgency, or pacification,
and how little was actually done—up to 1967 at least”
(emphasis in original).59 In explaining this lag between
policy pronouncements and practice, Komer cited
four impediments. First, institutional inertia causes
organizations to change slowly and incrementally.
Second, poor institutional memory, exacerbated by
short tours, impeded institutional learning. Third,
inappropriate incentives encouraged conformity and
punished innovation. Fourth, organizations failed to
analyze their performance because of a bureaucratic
reluctance to self-criticize.60
LESSONS FROM VIETNAM
How does our Vietnam experience inform our
efforts in Afghanistan? There are strategic similarities
between the two conflicts. As in Vietnam, American
forces face an insurgency that considers native popular sentiment (and, by extension, American public
opinion) to be the center of gravity. As did the VC, the
Taliban portray their cause as a struggle against a colonial occupier and its puppet. Afghan insurgents follow
their Vietnamese predecessors in undermining a struggling government which has difficulty extending its
power to the hinterlands.
There are also significant differences. In Vietnam,
the enemy fought a popular revolt eventually united
under communist ideology. Afghan violence, fueled
by tribal tensions, has varied sources, as theocratic
recidivists mix with anarchist warlords and drug

61

runners. There is also a great disparity in scale. The
VC thoroughly infiltrated much of the South, creating
a shadow government in large parts of the country.
The Taliban insurgency has never approached the size
of the Communist effort. Finally, the war in Vietnam
had multiple components, the insurgency coupled
with the NVA and great power sponsors in its effort
to overthrow the Saigon government. In Afghanistan,
the insurgents are largely on their own—while Pakistan provides a critical haven for fighters, it does
not threaten invasion.
However, these differences of scale and character
increase the relevance of Vietnam. While the insurgency
remains muted, the coalition should prevent its
spread. And with no conventional opponent looming,
American and allied forces have no “other war” to
distract from COIN.
The Army’s Reaction to the Vietnam War.
In Afghanistan, like Vietnam, the dominant military culture is not comfortable with COIN. The Army,
and the nation more broadly, interpreted the experience in Indochina as the error of attempting COIN,
when in fact the interagency effort had succeeded
when properly organized and resourced. Following
that war, the Army sought not to enhance its COIN
tactics and COIN schools that it had developed late
in the war; rather it expunged COIN from its doctrine
and focused again on the plains of Europe. For the
Army, the Vietnam War and its confused tactics had
been a decade-long distraction from the main event.
Before the fall of Saigon, the Army tasked General
William DePuy, the commander of the U.S. Army
Training and Doctrine Command, to develop a new
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doctrine. Looking not to the Mekong, but instead to
the Sinai and the 1973 armor clashes between Israel
and the Arab states, DePuy developed Active Defense
to repel a Warsaw Pact invasion. Reinvigorated, the
service debated the merits of the new way of fighting
and soon replaced it with AirLand Battle Doctrine,
which traded the conservative defense-in-depth for
coordinated ground and air thrusts to interdict Eastern
Bloc echelons before they reached the front. Although
never employed in its theater of design, many saw the
Gulf War as a vindication of AirLand Battle.
Today’s generals, commissioned in the days of
Active Defense and AirLand Battle, led companies
and battalions during the Gulf War and imbued their
Army with the supremacy of American firepower
and technology, coupling their battlefield experience
with the heritage of World War II. The accelerating
pace of the revolution in military affairs during the
subsequent decade, followed by the quick capture
of Kabul and Baghdad, cemented the primacy of the
new conventional military, with political and military
leaders alike in awe of network-centric warfare. The
events of 9/11 had brought a new type of enemy, but
not a new doctrine, as many in the military and the
DoD failed to acknowledge the familiar symptoms
of insurgency. Only in 2004, after the Taliban and
Saddam’s fedayeen refused to accept the apparent
triumph, did the military again consider COIN.
But Big Army still holds sway. For most of the
American intervention in Afghanistan, reservist Civil
Affairs colonels directed PRTs, but sometimes clashed
with their combat arms counterparts for influence in
the battlespace. Leadership of a team, while respected,
was not the route to stars in the Army; active duty
officers instead sought the traditional major command,
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the maneuver battalion, allegedly tailored to the
demands of insurgency, but insulated from deployed
civilians who are relegated to the PRTs. During 2006,
Air Force and Navy officers took command of most
American PRTs to assist our stretched Soldiers. That
the Army and Civil Affairs ceded the PRT role when
searching for a way to conserve manpower reveals the
priority of the interagency COIN mission within the
service.
The military is not alone in its resistance to the
principles of COIN. Civilian departments, even
USAID and State with their international mission,
have not embraced COIN as a focus of their overseas
efforts. The nonmilitary agencies have prevented the
development of new teams through slow personnel
deployment,61 failed to couple their national programs
with their provincial programs, and resisted unified
civil-military authority or even robust Chief of Mission
authority over the civilian side.62
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SECTION V. WHY THE SEGREGATED
RESPONSE?
Civil-military integration in the American response
to the Afghan insurgency has lagged for three reasons.
First, the organizational culture of civilian departments
differs from that of the military. Second, the executive
branch has not matched the efforts of the Johnson
administration to promote integration. Finally, the
American societal concept of war still reserves the
battlefield for the military, expecting little political
interference or civilian participation at the operational level and below. In the face of these obstacles, the
government has forsaken unified authority, and
instead pretends that “unity of effort” is sufficient.
CULTURAL DIFFERENCES
Military culture relies on force, rewards action,
embraces command, and is reassured by quantitative
metrics. Command improves mission efficiency in
any environment, but the other three attributes may
reinforce a short-term outlook that is ill-suited for
insurgency. In contrast, the civilian agencies stress
persuasion over coercion, deliberation over quick decision, consensus over authority, individuality over
teamwork, and effects rather than results. Some of
these attributes are applicable to COIN, but all conflict
with the warrior culture, and thus impede unity in
theater.
The Military.
Conventional battle demands decisiveness. Fortune
favors the side, whether defense or offense, which
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develops, rehearses, and most importantly, efficiently
executes its operational plan. This does not imply rigid
allegiance to the original strategy. The chaos of combat
requires constant refinement based on the new realities
of the dynamic environment; quick implementation
of these adjustments may carry the day. But immediate action is not always as effective in COIN as
in conventional combat. The irregular environment
sometimes rewards a restrained commander who
appraises the village alliances before attacking or
apprehending purported insurgents.
Command is the most effective decisionmaking
process in an environment that rewards speed over
perfection. The military embraces faith-based authority in which a subordinate obeys an order, whether or
not convinced by its logic, because he understands that
his picture of the battlefield is less complete than that of
the commander. The directive decisionmaking process
of the battlefield permeates other aspects of military
life, thus creating an organization comfortable with
hierarchy. Recognizing that the effective waging of war
depends on the fulfillment of each individual’s duty in
accordance with the commander’s intent, the military
creates an environment in which subordinate officers
see themselves as members of a team and ensure that
their units or areas of responsibility contribute to the
overall mission of the organization. Doctrine gives each
member, from private to general, a familiarity with the
way to fight, and a confidence that the commander’s
directives will fall within accepted parameters.
Guided by the sequential decisionmaking process
of battle, the commander needs data to evaluate and
adjust the plan. The military culture promotes metrics
as the input, and sets milestones as intermediate
goals en route to victory. Conventional war is par-
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ticularly suited to metrics—the American military
can measure its gains by ground captured and tanks
destroyed, carriers sunk, and divisions enveloped.
But destructive metrics are generally more mensurable
than constructive, and in insurgency, when ground is
often nominally in the control of the occupation but
infested with insurgents, the military must rely on
more abstract measures of popular support. Against
guerrillas, commanders unable to resist the simplicity
of negative metrics may succumb to rebel body count
as an indicator of success. Even those who maintain
that less palpable progress, rather than tangible destruction, is a surer route to defeating an insurgency,
may employ measurements which emphasize results
(number of wells or schools constructed) rather than
less easily mensurable effects (community nutritional
benefits and educational levels). In sum, the culture
of metrics prefers quantifiable markers to those more
abstract.
Finally, the military tends to perceive campaigns in
a short time frame. Missions in its comfort zone have
clear goals, a finite duration, and a specific exit strategy.
At operational and tactical levels, commanders and
units feel that they have a job to complete by the end
of a tour. When combined with the culture of action
and metrics, this mindset may have a negative impact
on a counterinsurgency campaign. A unit is eager to
show progress during a 6- or 12-month tour through
concrete results. It may initiate projects designed for
short-term gain rather than long-term improvements,
such as schools constructed with little regard for the
local government’s capacity to provide teachers, or
jobs created with little attention to the effects on the
local economy and village power structure.
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State and Other Civilian Agencies.
As the military is accustomed to interstate conflict,
the State Department is designed for traditional stateto-state relations. There are significant differences
between the two departments. The Ambassador cannot ordinarily force his counterpart to yield, but rather
must persuade a sovereign power to assent. Whereas
battle favors decisive action, diplomacy requires
deliberation over the prolonged cycle of negotiation,
which not only characterizes relations with the
host nation, but also the forming of alliances within
the mission and with members of other embassies.
Bureaucratic structure reinforces these different
approaches to decisionmaking. With a small planning
organization, an embassy has difficulty matching the
decisionmaking pace of a task force command, since
diplomats “can’t keep up with a stable of 200 overcaffeinated majors.”1
Whereas one state can force war upon another,
states must agree to negotiate with each other. No
matter the disparity in strength of the parties, there
must be a consensus between each that the agreement
is preferable to the status quo; if not, one state will
not accede to the proposal. Because each side holds
this veto power, even the best diplomat may have
limited effect on an obdurate counterpart. Recognizing
the inevitability of compromise and mindful of
future negotiation, the diplomat recalls the historic
admonition, “Above all, not too zealous.”2
The military grooms its officers for command. The
rising diplomat, with no troops to direct, demonstrates
his individual excellence through the available
avenues—cables to the mission and Washington, and
service to the Chief of Mission. When he becomes
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ambassador, the diplomat does not see his power
derived from the force-multiplying effect of a grand
team, but rather from the impact of his skill as a
negotiator, the clarity of his strategic vision, and
the clout of the coalition developed through his
relationships. With fewer leadership opportunities
during a career, an FSO is less comfortable with
command and its hierarchy, progressing instead in
a system that puts a premium on relationships with
foreign counterparts and embassy colleagues. While
mammoth scale requires doctrine to impart common
operating concepts on the military, diplomats resist a
formulaic course of action that strips the art from the
consensus-building that comprises their duties. To
some degree, the training in negotiation prepares FSOs
for the intimate and frustrating relationship with the
local sovereign that characterizes COIN. But COIN is
still war and, as such, requires the decisiveness enabled
by command and broad management experience
gained in the military.
Additionally, the success of the diplomat is less
prone to measurement. Negotiations may succeed or
fail, but the process and the results are only grossly
quantifiable. It is difficult to attribute values to
particular stages of talks—what influences actually
determined the final arrangement?
Finally, the military and diplomatic cultures have
different conceptions of time. While the military
hopes to quickly enter and exit a conflict, diplomats
seek to maintain tolerable relations with a state, a
task without end. Military culture encourages shortterm accomplishment, but State leaders may be more
concerned about the sustainability of programs. For
COIN, enduring solutions are important, as they
extend the control of the local government. However,
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the interest of diplomats in returning to normality
may undermine a COIN effort, as institutional norms
promote a peacetime manning and organizational
structure that is ill-suited for the demands of insurgency. In Afghanistan, several government officials
noted that the recent decision to normalize the Embassy
in Kabul decreased the level of integration with the
military and between civilian agencies.3
Pink on Pink.4
Cultural differences also impede integration of the
State Department and USAID, despite their shared
heritage. In peacetime, the two agencies work closely
within American missions in developing countries
and both prioritize relationships with local officials.
USAID has been brought under State direction over
the past decade, but this subordination has occurred
only at the highest levels of the organizations—the
administrator of USAID now reports to the Secretary
of State, and serves concurrently as the Director of
Foreign Assistance (responsible for most State funds
as well as USAID grants). Below the administrator,
the agency functions as a separate organization from
the State Department, with the USAID headquarters
directing overseas projects and funding. This
separation reinforces cultural differences. While diplomats may consider themselves strategic thinkers
helping to set broad policies from an embassy, USAID
representatives perceive themselves as implementers
who feel at home when in the field.
On the provincial teams, each agency does its
thing—FSOs seek to influence local political leaders,
while development workers use their funding to
improve infrastructure. Portions of USAID culture
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are also considerably influenced by the NGO ideals
of humanitarian assistance, which dictate that donors
deliver aid on the basis of need and refrain from using
assistance as political leverage. USAID relies heavily
on contractors, many of whom previously worked
with NGOs, whose neutral spirit makes them less
comfortable than their military or State counterparts
with the coupling of local programs to a patently
political mission—extending the reach and authority
of the Kabul government. One employee who had
spent extensive time in Afghanistan examining
USAID’s role on PRTs noted, “There is still a philosophical battle between old USAID and new USAID.
Those who joined 20-30 years ago . . . have a hard time
adjusting to how we’re supporting stability operations,
and how we’re related to counterinsurgency.”5
“IT DIDN’T TAKE LINCOLN THIS LONG”6
COIN scholar Andrew Krepinevich attributes the
lack of unified authority in Afghanistan to executive
indifference. His evaluation echoes the lessons of
Vietnam, which suggest that true integration requires
prolonged presidential attention.
The Kennedy administration recognized the nature
of the conflict in Vietnam and sought to focus the
government on the threat through directives to the
military, an interagency task force (Special Group—
Counter Insurgency), and a policy document which
described the danger of insurgency and the appropriate
American assistance to the host government. The
“United States Overseas Internal Defense Policy”
called for an integrated civilian and military effort,
directed by the Chief of Mission.7 Although they
espoused the new principles of unified response, the
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bureaucracies successfully avoided integration. Aware
that organizations advertise change while shunning
true reform, President Johnson tried several times to
force unity of command on all American efforts in
Vietnam. He granted Taylor control over all American
assets, military and civilian, in 1964, but the retired
general failed to employ his power. Two years later,
Johnson found another reluctant partner, Deputy Chief
of Mission William Porter, who would not embrace
command over the more limited COIN mission.
However, the President’s attention did not wane, and
in Komer he found a lieutenant eager to exercise this
broad mandate.
Four decades later, the government has again
focused much attention on COIN. Most significantly,
the State Department is promoting a Civilian Response Corps which would provide hundreds, and
eventually 2,000, deployable civilian experts to
assist COIN efforts. If passed by Congress, this will
dramatically increase the civilian agency’s capacity in
COIN. Other COIN initiatives have focused on training
and education. In the last year, the State Department’s
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs and DoD’s
Office of Stability Operations have jointly organized
conferences, created a website, and led the drafting of
“21st Century Counterinsurgency: A Guide for U.S.
Policymakers,” to introduce the broader government
community to the challenges of COIN. DoD is leading
the development of a Center for Complex Operations
which will coordinate the courses each department
has developed to train its personnel in COIN. The
Center for Army Lessons Learned has drafted a “PRT
Playbook” to educate the multiagency teams. The
government has recently developed combined courses
to train civilian and military personnel deploying
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to PRTs. These are important changes and bolster
interdepartmental cultural familiarity.
The government also recognizes the importance
of an integrated civil-military response to insurgency.
Published jointly by the Army and Marine Corps last
year, Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, contends
that “[a]lthough military efforts are necessary and
important, they are only effective if integrated into a
comprehensive strategy employing all instruments
of national power.”8 In Directive 3000.05, issued
November 28, 2005, the Pentagon declares that
“integrated civilian and military efforts are key to
successful stability operations. Whether conducting
or supporting stability operations, the Department of
Defense shall be prepared to work closely with relevant
U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments
and security forces, global and regional international
organizations.”9 One week later, the President signed
NSPD-44 directing the Secretary of State to “coordinate
and lead integrated United States Government efforts”
in order “(i) to coordinate and strengthen efforts of the
United States Government to prepare, plan for, and
conduct reconstruction and stabilization assistance
. . . in a range of situations that require the response
capabilities of United States Government entities, and
(ii) to harmonize such efforts with U.S. military plans
and operations.”10
But these efforts are not sufficient. While the Bush
administration gave considerable attention to COIN,
it never reached the necessary level of commitment to
a unified authority; it took several years of such executive insistence to wear down the bureaucracies and
achieve unity of command in Vietnam. Instead of major
in-theater organizational reforms, the government has
relied on the ad hoc evolution of PRTs, allowing the
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departments to maintain insulated reporting chains.
In Washington, bureaucratic adjustments are similarly
limited—NSPD-44 conferred influence on a new
directorate within the State Department, the Office
of Reconstruction and Stabilization. However, this
“lead” does not translate to authority or money, so
State has no power to direct a unified effort to assist a
struggling government. Furthermore, the Coordinator
is an Assistant Secretary, limiting his influence even
within the State Department where other bureaus
resist the new organization. This internecine conflict
diminishes the clout of the office in talks with other
departments. Officials from State and Defense cite the
contentious negotiations regarding security responsibilities for PRTs in Iraq, which delayed full deployment of the teams for over a year, as a product of
ambiguous departmental responsibilities. Thus, despite the policy focus in Washington, neither the
Presidential Directive nor departmental injunction has
called for a single unified command at the theater and
tactical level; in the field, segregated command still
prevents integrated response.
WORLD WAR II, ITS GENERAL, AND THE
AMERICAN PSYCHE
Cultural tensions between the agencies and the
government’s unwillingness to unify authority impede the American response to insurgency. Less apparent, but no less determining, is American society’s
discomfort with COIN, demonstrated by the fact
that our COIN success in Vietnam has not been more
widely recognized. The aversion to irregular warfare
stems from three legacies of industrial-age victories,
particularly World War II. First, Americans prefer the
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putative separation between political and military
functions in conventional warfare over the intimacy
between military actions and political effect called for
by COIN. As part of this ideal, people imagine a form
of warfare in which noncombatants are little involved.
Second, the popular recollection of World War II
minimizes the civilian contribution to the victory,
instead attributing success to the military’s freedom
from political interference. Third, Americans share
General MacArthur’s impatience with the strictures
of limited war that have replaced the World War II
commitment to victory. These factors fuel the American citizen’s anxiety with COIN, a quintessentially
political-military form of war which blurs the lines
between combatants and civilians, demands political
guidance at every level, and depends not on preponderance of force but on discrimination in applying it.
The American Way of War.
Government documents and professional journals
describe insurgency as primarily political, as if
conventional war were not.11 But at a macro level,
conventional war is as political in its essence as
insurgency. It changes the fabric of power—territorial
sovereignty, control of natural resources, the fate of a
regime—as much as an insurgency does. The difference between an insurrection and conventional conflict
is found at the micro level. In the former, the politics
is incremental and ubiquitous. The private must
consider how his bearing at a checkpoint will sway the
scores that pass through during his 6-hour watch, their
loyalty being the prime determinant of the war. Which
political competitor will they choose, the nascent state
and its foreign protector or the insurgency? In orthodox
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war, the politics is deferred in the American mind—it
falls at the end, after the fighting, at the negotiating
table. The general in command need not worry about
the instantaneous effects of his actions on the local
population. The enemy’s forces are uniformed, as are
his; one army will remain on the field at the end of the
day, and it is the commander’s job to kill as many of the
enemy army while losing as few of his own as possible,
with little worry about distant civilians.
The peculiarities of America’s World War II experience exacerbate this misperception of the separation between the political and military. For the
United States, the fight began and ended in the Pacific,
a theater named for a broad ocean, not a teeming
continent. At sea, warfare mirrors the apolitical ideal.
Admirals have the terrifying but unambiguous task
of destroying the enemy force. The political effect—a
blockade, a stranded colony—follows the naval battle,
completely segregated from the throes of combat. And,
with their misery distant from our shores, it is harder
to remember the civilian targets, the Japanese starving
as their merchant fleet sank. Recalling the ground combat of both theaters, history focuses on clashes with the
enemy, with little attention to the noncombatants, often
unable to escape the front, swept up in the carnage.
With news media intent on bolstering morale on
the home front, Americans were spared most of the
details of the civilian horror of World War II. The
public was aware in the abstract of the human price
borne by the enemy populations (particularly through
strategic bombing), but this seemed a necessary cost
in conquering the aggressor nations and ending a just
war. In Vietnam, with a less pliant press, the public
saw the intimate misery of the war, and it was difficult
to conceive how the suffering of innocents contributed
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to our support of their state. The apparently antiseptic
fight of the Gulf War returned the United States to the
simpler political goal of expelling an invader, but with
the promise of discriminating weaponry that largely
spared the civilian population.
Team America.
It is not only the intimately political nature of
insurgency and the confused role of noncombatants
that trouble our nation. It is also the idea that war must
be constrained by close political guidance and fought
by more than the armed services. In the American
psyche, our nation’s greatest triumph was delivered
by the military, free from meddling politicians.
School children read of titans Patton, Eisenhower,
MacArthur, Nimitz, and Arnold, leading an Army
slashing towards Berlin and an invasion force hopping
across the Pacific islands, both protected by a vast
air armada. This victory has forged a distorted ideal
of warfare—military action integrated with political
guidance only at the highest level of strategic command,
but segregated at the operational and tactical level. The
reality, of course, was different, with Roosevelt very
much involved in operations as well as strategy.
Nor was civilian participation in the war limited
to the Commander in Chief and his advisers. Civilians
directed the wartime economy, evaluated strategic
bombing and maritime shipping, manned merchant
convoys, and staffed the postwar reconstruction. But
Americans have forgotten the breadth of the effort.
We remember it as a triumph of arms, won by soldiers
alone in the field, which, while fueled by stateside labor
and industry, was neither complicated by deployed
civilians nor hampered by intrusive politicians. G.I.
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Joe and Rosie the Riveter are still revered, but who has
ever heard of Harry Hopkins?
This conception of the military fighting abroad,
supported by civilians at home, continues today.
“Service” and “veteran” apply only to uniformed
personnel. News programs devote clips to the sacrifice
of soldiers and yellow ribbons urge Americans to
“support our troops.” Society still envisions campaigns
waged by warriors alone; the little coverage of civilians
in theater focuses on the role of contractors, the bête
noire de jour.
MacArthur’s Legacy.
According to our national narrative, the political
mandate for unconditional surrender during World
War II loosed the nation’s might and freed our generals
and admirals from political meddling. There were no
significant negotiations with the Axis to constrain the
Allied drives to Berlin and Tokyo. Theater commanders
enjoyed latitude in their delegated authority over
forces (though not to the degree popularly remembered as intra-Alliance negotiations certainly constrained
the generals). To the extent that political guidance
was more distant than in the past, World War II was
unusual in its terms of unconditional surrender. But
the Cold War, with nuclear stakes, resumed the more
restrained calculus. No longer was the United States
pursuing total victory; the Soviet specter dictated that
political leaders intensify their control over the scope
of a regional conflict lest it become global. This return
to tight civilian control and constrained national means
created civil-military tension since the military had
been accustomed to the looser reins and vast resources
of World War II. During the Korean War, MacArthur

84

found himself unable to accept the new paradigm of
limited war. After he publicly criticized Truman’s
decision not to bomb and blockade mainland China,
the President relieved him from duty on April 11, 1951.
Upon return from Korea, he toured the nation a
hero, enjoying a grand parade and rapt audiences. One
week following his dismissal, MacArthur spoke before a joint session of Congress. Explaining his calls for
more aggressive action against China, the general
lamented the stalemate in Korea and claimed that:
“Once war is forced upon us, there is no other
alternative than to apply every available means to
bring it to a swift end. War’s very object is victory—not
prolonged indecision. In war, indeed, there can be no
substitute for victory.”12
Inspiring words, certainly, but a terrifying message.
For MacArthur, victory was the enlistment of national
power to conquer the peninsula for the Free World,
even at the risk of wider war with China and the
Soviet Union. For Truman, victory was more modest,
the defense of the young southern Republic and the
preservation of the UN coalition. The President,
after indulging the hero’s hubris in the fall of 1950
and suffering China’s mass entry into the war had
realized that strategic myopia benighted the general’s
operational genius, disqualifying him from continuing
in command.
The relief brought wide public and congressional
criticism. Eventually, hearings on Capitol Hill judged
the President’s actions proper, and the nation averted
a constitutional crisis. The general’s luster was
dimmed, but even today his advocacy of broad latitude for the theater commander, with military might
unconstrained, resonates with the popular stereotype
of the “Good” World War II. The Pentagon pays
homage with a “MacArthur Corridor.” Its center
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alcove, where promotion and award ceremonies are
held, displays a placard with an excerpt from the “no
substitute for victory” speech in 2-inch letters.13
Today, Korea is remembered as a draw, the
opening act of America’s confused entry into the era
of limited war, which crescendoed with the debacle
of Vietnam. A prominent narrative still blames that
defeat on resource constraints and operational limits
that hamstrung American forces.14 However, the
total war model—invading neighbors and pressing
north towards Hanoi—may not have brought quick
victory but instead simply broadened the insurgency
and risked deeper Chinese and Soviet involvement.
The United States lost in South Vietnam because of a
misapplication, not a lack, of resources.
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SECTION VI. THE ROLE OF UNITY OF
COMMAND—
AN EXAMINATION OF DOCTRINE AND
LANGUAGE
In the face of different organizational cultures,
a lack of attention by the administration, and dated
societal conceptions of war, the government seems
to have made the unconscious assumption that it will
not be able to bring unity of command to its various
departments and has instead settled for a proxy,
unity of effort. In doing so, the government has failed
to apply the fundamental principle of war, unified
command, to insurgency. The challenge of uniting
bureaucracies is not surprising—it has long plagued
the American military, and was finally addressed only
late in the game by the combatant command system,
which evolved over 4 decades as the government
gradually shifted power from the services to a
unitary military commander exercising authority
over joint forces. But, because the United States is
still reluctant to accept insurgency, with its intimate
political nature and combined civil-military response,
as war, the government has not applied the lessons of
interservice management to multiagency war. While
contemporary military doctrine stresses the need for
unity of command to achieve unified effort, guidelines
for multiagency work substitute the language of
friendly persuasion for directive, embracing an elusive
unity of effort without the requisite unity of command.
Rather than apply the military’s joint model across
U.S. Government departments, policymakers have
surprisingly settled for a coalition, or mutual-consent
model, with its accompanying inefficiencies, even
though all the members work for the same leader.
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UNITY OF EFFORT—THE FRUIT OF UNITY OF
COMMAND
The Path to Unified Authority within the Military.
American governments have frequently attempted
to impose common direction on the disparate elements
of its military. Colonials struggled to unify the action
of the Continental Army and militias, and the ideology
of devolved power plagued the Confederacy as governors refused to relinquish control of their forces to
Richmond. Interservice disputes hampered American
efforts in World War II. To address these challenges,
the 1947 National Security Act began a gradual shift in
power from the services to the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs, and eventually the Combatant Commanders
(CCDRs), culminating with the Goldwater-Nichols
legislation of 1986.
In the early 1980s, a series of poor military
performances inspired the Goldwater-Nichols Act.
Inadequate interservice preparation hamstrung
the Desert One hostage rescue mission; confusion
about command responsibility for the Marine
Barracks in Beirut surfaced in the investigation
following Hezbollah’s attack; and a lack of common
communications and doctrine impeded operations
in Grenada. Among other measures, GoldwaterNichols increased the power of the CCDRs relative
to the services by granting more control of budget
and training, and clearly asserting the commanders’
responsibilities and authorities.
The act is clear about the importance of unity of
command and its inextricably linked authority and
responsibility. It asserts the “intent of Congress” as
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being:
to place clear responsibility on commanders of
the unified and specified combatant commands
for the accomplishment of missions assigned to
those commands, to ensure that the authority
of the commanders of the unified and specified
combatant commands is fully commensurate
with the responsibility of those commanders for
the accomplishment of missions assigned to their
commands.1

To accomplish missions delegated by the President
and the Secretary of Defense, the act gives each CCDR
authority to direct his subordinate commands, no
matter their service composition, in all aspects of joint
operations, joint training, and logistics. Furthermore,
it establishes that the CCDR has the authority to alter
the command structure as he sees fit and suspend
subordinates.
The act vests “planning, advice, and policy
formulation” authority in the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs.2 Through this power, the Chairman has
developed Joint Publications, a series of doctrinal
statements which serve as authoritative guidance for
all members of the military regarding how to fight;
“this doctrine will be followed except when, in the
judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise.”3 This joint doctrine supersedes
that of the individual services.
Joint Doctrine and the Principle of Command.
Joint doctrine codifies operational practices and
warfare philosophy with command directives. Joint
Publication-1 (JP 1), Doctrine for the Armed Forces of
the United States, is the “capstone publication for all
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joint doctrine, presenting fundamental principles
and overarching guidance for the employment of
the Armed Forces of the United States.”4 It leaves
no ambiguity about the importance of command in
military performance, as well as its consolidation
under a single authority. JP 1 asserts that “inherent in
command is the authority that a military commander
lawfully exercises over subordinates including
authority to assign missions and accountability for
their successful completion.”5 While a commander
may delegate authority, he retains responsibility for
fulfilling missions.
To integrate the varied capabilities of the Armed
Forces, JP 1 describes the unity of command exercised
by the CCDRs or assigned Joint Task Force Commanders (JFCs), which means that “all forces operate under a
single commander with the requisite authority to direct
all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose.”6
The first principle of a Joint Force organization is
simplicity—“[u]nity of command must be maintained
through an unambiguous chain of command, welldefined command relationships, and clear delineation
of responsibilities and authorities.”7 In practice, the
military achieves unity of command by “establishing
a joint force, assigning a mission, or objective(s) to the
designated JFC, establishing command relationships,
assigning and/or attaching appropriate forces to the
joint force, and empowering the JFC with sufficient
authority over the forces to accomplish the assigned
mission.”8
Unity of Command Begets Unity of Effort.
Doctrine asserts that for joint military operations
“[t]he purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity
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of effort under one responsible commander for every
objective.”9 Unified authority gives a commander the
power to direct personnel and resources to a common
goal. Since unity of effort is the direct consequence
of unity of command for interservice operations, the
doctrine stresses the primacy of unity of command,
accepting it as one of nine “Principles of War” on the
third page of JP 1; there is no need to list unity of effort,
since it is subsumed in the master principle, and it does
not appear.10
As unity of command is the surest route to unity
of effort, joint doctrine notes its desirability outside
military operations but concedes the task is daunting.
JP 1 warns that during “multinational operations and
interagency coordination, unity of command may not
be possible, but the requirement for unity of effort
becomes paramount.”11 Whereas unity of command
is the sine qua non of unity of effort in joint military
operations, the publication leaves readers little
indication how to achieve that unity of effort without
the “requisite authority to direct all forces” that joint
military commanders enjoy.12
UNITY OF EFFORT—THE BEST HOPE IN
ABSENCE OF UNITY OF COMMAND
The Multiagency Alternative.
To address the heterogeneous nature of war,
the Joint Staff has published Joint Publication 3-08,
Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint
Operations. The document reveals how the military,
as the dominant player in counterinsurgency, views
its relations with the other departments, as well as
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international actors. While JP 1 stresses that “unity of
command is central to unity of effort,”13 JP 3-08 ignores
unity of command; instead the interagency publication
relies on coordination, cooperation, and harmonization to achieve unity of effort.
JP 3-08 accepts the fundamental premise of sound
strategy—the first page declares that “the integration
of U.S. political and military objectives and the subsequent translation of these objectives into action have
always been essential to success at all levels of operation,”14 and describes the components of this
integration as the “diplomatic, informational, military,
and economic instruments of national power.”15
How does the military expect the U.S. Government
to integrate these tools? The answer can be found
in JP 1, through unity of effort. But absent are the
“requisite authority” and the “unambiguous chain of
command” that JP 1 cited as the key components for
unity of command in achieving “common purpose.”
In the capstone publication, this common purpose is
synonymous with unity of effort.16 Instead, in JP 3-08,
unity of effort becomes a means as well as an end,
and the publication claims that “unity of effort in an
operation ensures all means are directed to a common
purpose.”17 While JP 3-08 does not define unity of
effort, the DoD’s Dictionary of Military and Associated
Terms, part of the same doctrinal series published
by the Joint Staff, unity of effort is the “coordination
and cooperation toward common objectives, even if
the participants are not necessarily part of the same
command or organization.”18 Combine the injunctions
in the preceding two sentences, and the circular logic
becomes apparent: “coordination and cooperation
toward common objectives . . . ensures all means are
directed to a common purpose.”19 How can mere
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“coordination and cooperation” act to “ensure”
any outcome if members refuse to “coordinate and
cooperate?”20
Unity of effort is the route to integration in both
joint and multiagency operations; but, in the absence
of unity of command in the latter, what is the route to
unity of effort? It seems to be mutual understanding
and good will. According to JP 3-08, “coordinating
and integrating efforts between the joint forces
and other government agencies, IGOs, and NGOs,
should not be equated to command and control
of a military operation.”21 JP 3-08 recognizes that
the cultural gaps between departments, including
different goals, procedures, and decisionmaking
processes, impede unity of effort.22 To bridge these,
this manual maintains that “close, continuous
interagency and interdepartmental coordination and
cooperation are necessary to overcome confusion over
objectives, inadequate structure or procedures, and
bureaucratic and personal limitations. Action will
follow understanding.”23 The reader wonders how far
action lags understanding and whether coordination
and cooperation will be sufficient to conquer obstacles
which, within the military, required the unified
authority of the Goldwater-Nichols interservice
reforms.
Differences in Joint Publication Terminology.24
Contrast the directive terms in JP 1 with the hortative language of JP 3-08. JP 1 cites “unity of command” 23 times, usually in the context of unity of effort.
The same phrase appears twice, and only tangentially,
in JP 3-08. “Authority” appears 350 times in JP 1; in
JP 3-08, only 73. “Responsibility” and “responsible”
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appear nearly 250 times in JP 1; in JP 3-08, fewer than
100. “Accountability” or “accountable” appears 9 times
in JP 1; JP 3-08 never uses either. In the place of these
words, JP 3-08 uses softer terms. “Coordination” and
its derivatives appear nearly 400 times, or four times
per page and at twice the rate as JP 1. JP 3-08 cites
“consensus” 12 times; the word never appears in JP 1.
Foreigners.
The inclusion of intergovernmental organizations
(IGOs) and NGOs in large part explains the absence of
directive language in JP 3-08. The American government has different constituencies, goals, and mandates
than do Save the Children, the Red Crescent, or
UNICEF, and no authority over most IGOs and NGOs.
But why are other U.S. departments lumped with these
international actors? All U.S. departments work for the
same executive, represent the same nation, and strive
for the same success in theater—one would expect that
interdepartmental integration would be easier than its
international counterpart. But so far as direction by
the military is concerned, the rest of the United States
government is as foreign as IGOs and NGOs.
The complicated title, “Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations” is not
simply a reflection of the military’s attitude towards
other American departments. More broadly, it suggests the difficulties of coordinating operations with
other departments when there is no formal system of
unified authority analogous to the Combatant Command, to direct civil-military operations. The Director
of the Joint Staff, a 3-star general, signed this document.
It is widely disseminated through the government,
since it informs civilian agencies what to expect in
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operations with the military, and has suffered no
backlash. The lack of displeasure indicates that while
government and outside observers, and the very doctrine itself, recognize the need for integration between
all departmental efforts, officials in the military and
the civilian agencies have conceded that unified action
between various branches of the American government presents the same difficulties as integration
with international actors. Moreover, by ignoring the
lessons of CORDS presented 4 decades ago, they have
forsaken unified authority, the surest path to unity of
effort.
JP 3-08 Terms and the Broader Government.
Other national security guidance governing counterinsurgency parrots the soft language of JP 3-08. It
calls for more cooperation, closer coordination, and
greater harmonization. On multiagency management
charts, dotted lines of cooperation replace the solid
lines of authority that characterize the diagrams of
individual departments (civilian and military alike);
ovals replace rectangles. The government assigns a
“lead agency” but fails to define the accompanying
powers, which in reality seem few. This label grants
neither funding nor control—one official described it
as conferring “all the responsibility and none of the
authority.”25
NSPD-44 (for the whole government) and DoD
Directive 3000.05 (for DoD, uniformed and civilian, in
its interaction with other departments) are the primary
directives which guide agencies as they struggle to
adapt to the forgotten form of COIN warfare. The
President signed NSPD-44 in December 2005 to
“promote the security of the United States through
improved coordination, planning, and implementa97

tion for reconstruction and stabilization assistance for
foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition
from, conflict or civil strife.”26 This mission is similar
to, though broader in scope than, the PRTs’ mission.
The Directive assigns the Secretary of State two tasks:
to “coordinate and lead integrated United States
Government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments
and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare,
plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction
activities”; and to “coordinate such efforts with the
Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any
planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across
the spectrum of conflict.”27 But to achieve this twopronged mission, the directive gives the Secretary little
real power, instead assigning a list of tasks to “coordinate” with other agencies. “Coordinate” and cognates
appear 24 times; “authority” appears thrice (only in
a final paragraph of caveats), “responsibility” and
related words four times, and “accountability” once
(with no uses of “accountable”). The document does
describe a “lead” and “supporting” model for different
agencies in particular missions, but provides no detail
on what powers and duties these labels confer.
If the President himself is not comfortable subordinating departments to real authority, we should
not expect the broader government to do so. DoD
3000.05, published a few months before JP 3-08,
prefigured the Joint Publication’s consignment of the
multiagency community to the foreign realm. The 11page directive uses the phrase “other U.S. Departments
and Agencies, foreign governments and security
forces, International Organizations, NGOs, and members of the private Sector,”28 11 times, noting that
Defense personnel should cooperate, form civilmilitary teams, draft plans, share information, and
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train with this conglomerate. Only in intelligencesharing, schooling, and personnel support does the
memo distinguish the relations between executive
departments from relations with international entities.
The point of this analysis is not to question laudable
efforts to coordinate overseas operations with extragovernmental actors; rather, it is to demonstrate
that the uniformed military is not alone in its low
estimation of the prospects of multiagency integration,
as all ignore the fact that every department works
for the same country, the same government, and the
same President. Cooperation and coordination are
appropriate routes towards coupling American power
with that of its allies, IGOs, and NGOs, which may
have complementary but distinct goals. However, that
the American government should view these same
elements of loose collaboration as the main means to
unify multiagency action demonstrates that officials
have lost hope for the tight command structure which
was so successful in CORDS. That the government
has finally accepted an appropriate system, unified
authority, to address similar problems in the military
makes the current intransigence all the more surprising.
Of course, the concept of authority is not unique
to the military. The only instance where the verb
“direct” is used imperatively in NSPD-44 relates to
the Secretary of State’s power over the Coordinator
for Reconstruction and Stabilization—all accept that
the Secretary’s power includes this authority over
subordinates within his department. Although the
Ambassador’s Chief of Mission authority over other
agencies is ambiguous, all Foreign Service Officers
know that the Ambassador is their boss. USAID
field officers have the same perspective toward their
country director.
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While no organization is as imbued as the
military with the concept of command and its mortal
implications, all institutions have its basic qualities.
Perhaps the most important function of an organization is to provide a decisionmaking mechanism for
its constituents. From decision derives action. The
military, teams, governments, and businesses have all
grasped the value of unified authority. Athletes follow
coaches, or risk sitting on the bench; employees obey
the directives of their bosses, lest they miss a promotion or lose their job; representatives contravene voters
at electoral peril. Although not as strict as the military, and not subject to the UCMJ, all of these organizations accept the fundamental tenet of management—
authority to direct action (whether creating a new
business division, crafting a game plan, or passing
legislation) coupled with responsibility for its effects.
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SECTION VII. PROSPECTS
Although most senior actors have, in the spirit of
JP 3-08, dismissed the possibility, unifying civil and
military authority in a single chain would address
many of the deficiencies of PRTs and the broader
American effort in Afghanistan. As indicated by JP
1, the lack of unity of command in Afghanistan has
diminished unity of effort. The absence of CORDSlike integration is especially surprising in areas where
there is no conventional fight to distract from COIN
as it did in Vietnam. PRT and country team members
recognize that the chain of command is not integrated,
but, having forsaken the possibility of unified authority, cite advantages of the stovepiped status quo.
Collocation is the greatest benefit brought by
PRTs, and policymakers should not minimize its
significance—common quarters, shared workdays,
and a strenuous environment forge strong bonds
among members that bridge many of the cultural differences and foster cooperation between departments.
But collocation alone does not remedy the problems
of remote management or diminish the role of personalities; nor does it enlist the concepts of accountability and authority to make our war effort more effective. Moreover, our leadership in Kabul no longer
enjoys the benefits of collocation.
Insurgency Alone.
In Vietnam, the large conventional aspect of the war
delayed the adoption of a COIN strategy and unified
chain of command. Scholars Andrew Krepinevich and
John Nagl cite the Army’s orthodox bias (favoring
heavy firepower, concentrated units, and body count
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over light infantry, dispersed units, and population
security) as an impediment to a proper COIN
approach.1 However, considering the strength of the
North Korean and Chinese conventional forces in the
previous war, it would have been careless for South
Vietnam and the United States to neglect to prepare
for an invasion by the NVA. This recognition of the role
for conventional forces in the defense of South Vietnam does not imply that the U.S. Government achieved
the proper management structure; it did not. Ideally,
the President would have united all efforts under a
single civil-military chain of command, as Johnson
attempted during Taylor’s tenure. Ultimately CORDS
was a partial solution, properly integrating all COIN
efforts but leaving the vast conventional mission
segregated from COIN.
While it was appropriate to prepare a portion of
the ARVN for conventional war, there is no analogue
in Afghanistan today. COIN is the only fight. The
Taliban and its associates are sufficiently weak that
the Afghan military will not have to face large-scale
battle; nor do neighbors threaten invasion as did
North Vietnam. The unitary nature of the war makes
a unified civil-military chain of command all the more
imperative. Moreover, as COIN is intimately political
and inextricable from the native population, the effort
should probably be guided by a civilian. However, the
United States is no closer to unified authority than it
was in the early 1960s, approximately 5 years before
CORDS was finally implemented. Field management
has not received the attention from Washington that
it did during the Vietnam War. Not surprisingly,
practitioners and doctrine writers seem to assume that
policymakers will fail to integrate civilian and military
authority.
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The Concerns about Unified Authority.
There is a tendency among participants to concede
that a literally integrated chain would be ideal, but
to defend whatever level of integration they have
experienced as the highest level feasible. General
Barno advocated clear authority and accountability
within the military chain of command through the
geographic assignments of the Regional Commands
but, describing his arrangement with Ambassador
Khalilzad, maintained that at the national level the
military and civilian chains should remain separate—
“the way we had it is as close to integration as we
would want to get. . . . We’re never going to find a
model where the military is subordinate in an act of
conflict to the Ambassador; we always need to keep
the [military] command channel up the military
side.”2 A Defense official noted that this sentiment
was pervasive, recounting feedback he consistently
received from mid-grade military officers who claimed
that uniformed personnel “could never report to
civilians—it was not allowed, and had never been
done.”3
Accompanying conceptual conservatism are
concerns about the desirability of a more tightly
integrated chain of command. One DoD official noted
the safeguards that redundant chains provided. She
maintained that unified authority was “theoretically”
desirable, “but what if we chose the wrong chain of
command? Now we hedge our bets with multiple
lines of funding.”4 A senior FSO thought that unified
authority would work if all team members had
common training and cultural awareness, but noted
that absent this integration of training and culture, it
was best to employ split chains, leaving that “theoret-
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ical ambiguity to make sure that the military commander, with all his advantages, must at least take
account of the theoretical independence of the State
partner, and take into account the consequences if
he runs the State official over.”5 Independent counsel
was cited by a State PRT member as an unambiguous
advantage of segregated command—“On a personal
level, the State and USAID persons are the only ones
not in the direct chain [of the PRT commander], so
the commander can bounce ideas off them. While the
commander can’t come across as uncertain [to military
personnel], he can consult these two.”6
THE AMELIORATIVE EFFECTS OF UNIFIED
AUTHORITY
Eliminating Remote Management.
The concerns in the previous section are legitimate, but do not outweigh the clear benefits of
integrated command. Unified authority addresses
two problems associated with remote management.
First, a consolidated chain would solve the problem of
underperformance isolated from supervision—now,
distant oversight spawns three loosely accountable
fiefdoms. Not all senior PRT officials will always
perform well, and those who do not are unlikely to
report their own failures objectively. The current
recourse for the remainder of the team is always
unpleasant, trying, inefficient, and often ineffective.
Initially, one of the tri-leaders must become sufficiently frustrated to pass the complaint up his own
chain of command. After arriving in Kabul, it must
go back down the chain of the charged official; back
up comes a response; and ideally a resolution travels
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down the chains of both the aggrieved and the accused.
At each stage, the grievance is likely to lose urgency,
and only one person need neglect it for no resolution.
Additionally, as described in the “Difficulty of Distant
Command” section of Section 3, senior officials in
Kabul often would rather preserve their own daily
relationship with their counterparts than advocate
for a remote subordinate who is unable to resolve an
issue locally. Because of the daunting recourse mechanism, problems often fester, or are addressed by an ad
hoc solution that isolates the impact of the difficult
player. This suboptimal solution is the only available
choice to a team suffering poor performance by one
member but without a single leader vested with the
authority to correct it. Unified authority would eliminate
this convoluted system; moreover, disputants, aware
of a clear system for on-site resolution, would likely
resolve an argument before it rose to the team leader.
Second, unified authority would improve the
response time of the team. One PRT veteran noted
that a team commander with real authority could,
upon “realizing that day that something bad was
happening, immediately swing the team members
to that problem without waiting for the individual
players to get permission” from distant authorities.7
This inability to act decisively spreads beyond the
team; for example, a Regional Commander might like
to accommodate the PRT military leader’s request to
steer national agricultural programs (managed by the
mission in Kabul) away from a warlord who siphons
off funds and refuses to cooperate with the Afghan
National Army. This request, even if accepted by all
departmental leaders at the team and RC level, must
first travel to USAID in Kabul, following the same
complex path that characterized intrateam dispute
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resolution. This case also illustrates the impediments
caused by the segregation of national and local USAID
programs, analogous to the separate chains for the
maneuver battalions and PRTs.
Diminishing the Role of Personality—Lifting the
Floor, Not Raising the Roof.
General Barno cites his close relationship with
Ambassador Khalilzad as crucial, and he is right that
“personalities matter regardless of the structure.”8
But personalities become especially important when
there is no clear responsibility and corresponding
authority. Because there is no system for resolving
disagreement other than parallel recourse to Kabul,
PRT members waste time and energy framing the
problem, estimating each other’s commitment to
a stated position, predicting the importance of the
desired result, and comparing the stakes of the current
dispute with those of possible future arguments. In
anticipation of these struggles and in the absence of an
integrated management system, departmental leaders
must continually defend their prerogatives.
The assessment of status may begin immediately
when a person arrives at the outpost, as the dynamic
established in the first couple weeks has inordinate
influence on turf issues. One FSO who worked at two
PRTs noted that when he reported at each, “I had to
make it clear to each PRT commander that I did not
work for them—‘My boss is the Ambassador.’ . . . I got
in arguments with the XO and the staff, who wondered
where I fit in the military hierarchy; the XO thought I
was part of the staff, and therefore worked for him. I
told him that ‘I don’t work for the PRT commander and
I sure don’t work for you.’”9 But as the management
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structure is ill-defined, and civilians and military may
be on different rotations, the skirmishes for status
continue, with petty issues evoking disproportionate
passion. One USAID representative recounted returning after leave to find a recently arrived FSO in
her office, claiming precedence as USAID was part of
the State Department. Determined not to lose face, the
USAID representative insisted to the interloper and
the military commander that she keep the room, and
they assented.10 A meeker USAID officer might have
capitulated, signaling weakness and yielding future
advantage to State and military counterparts.
To some extent, this jousting for influence happens
at any PRT, no matter the character of its members.
When personalities mesh, tension recedes and departmental leaders are able to coordinate activities constructively. At the best PRTs, the three officials will
create an ad hoc management structure, such as an
executive committee which meets nightly to coordinate
activities and hosts weekly meetings to reach out to
other organizations in the province. In these cases when
the colonel, the FSO, and the USAID representative
work well together, unified authority might add
clarity but would probably not significantly improve
an already smoothly functioning team.
But when one member does not have the same
vision as the others and personalities clash, the outlier, subject only to ineffective remote supervision,
may simply opt out of coordination, and work the programs in his sphere with little regard for the concerns
of his colleagues. Unified authority addresses these
situations, creating an arbiter on location.
Perhaps more importantly, unified authority
continually facilitates decision even when there is
no open dispute. With no final arbiter, departmental
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leaders must calculate whether or not to raise an
issue—is it worth the discussion, do I want to deal with
the potential disagreement, will it waste my capital?
Thus, many issues more minor but with significant
impact on the PRT mission may not even rise to the
negotiation phase, as a departmental leader accepts
an undesirable status quo in order to avoid a taxing
conflict.
COUPLING AUTHORITY WITH RESPONSIBILITY
The most important benefit of unified authority is
the wedding of the power to act with responsibility
for the actions’ effects. Currently, diffuse team leadership creates the expectation that departmental representatives should stay in their own lanes,—the State
FSO focuses on local diplomatic initiatives, the USAID
representative on development, and the military leader
on security. This bureaucratic tendency is enforced
by the guidance from the NSC’s Deputies Committee
in 2003. This model of stovepipes may accord with
American departmental divisions, but it does not
accommodate the complex nature of COIN, where an
action in one sector may have an immediate impact on
all three.11 One exasperated Defense official contended
that “when you say ‘de-conflicting,’ it means that you
want to stay in your lane. But guess what—your lane
is changing.”12
Collocation improves the efforts of diverse
departments, as each learns the others’ culture and
gains empathy for the others’ challenges. However,
segregated chains of command dampen the possible
gains. On a team, when a disagreement arises between
the three leaders over the effects of an action, the two
other leaders defer to the representative of the rele-
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vant department—each is responsible for his own
lane. In general this is appropriate—with a career in
the affected field, the expert probably has the best
idea of the correct course. Moreover, most decisions
in these fields are uncontroversial—USAID rep, FSO,
and military officer will usually agree that a particular
plan is best for a new school project or new powersharing agreement in the provincial government.
However, when decisions are controversial, it
is usually due to conflicting priorities—the military
officer believes that the immediate deployment of
Afghan National Police from another region will
increase village security, but the FSO worries that
it will undermine recent political progress made
with a warlord who hoped that members of his tribe
would provide manpower for a local security force.
Of course, both are probably right, and each might
admit the conflicting effects—the action will probably
simultaneously promote immediate security and
undermine negotiations. So the disagreement is not
over the effects of the action, but rather the prioritization. What is the surest route to victory: an immediate
drop in violence or the prospect of co-opting the
warlord?
Under stovepiped chains of command, as policymakers have not integrated authority between the
departments, the decision whether to act usually rests
with the team member who owns the relevant assets.
As a distant supervisor, rather than an empowered
PRT leader, evaluates a departmental representative,
he or she will follow the priorities of his department
measured by its particular metrics. This dynamic will
tend to favor action over restraint—self-evaluative
reports are more impressive if they demonstrate
tangible results (number of security forces trained,
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money spent, meetings held), no matter their effect
(which may be immensurable), than if they surmise
misfortunes averted because of wise deferral. Thus in
the debate between one departmental head who favors
a particular action and a counterpart who prefers
restraint, the owner of the assets will nearly always
prevail, and the decision will often be to act, even in
cases where inaction might produce greater net gain
across all three sectors.
The original PRT mission envisioned three
spheres—reconstruction (and economic development)
falling to USAID, security to the military, and the
extension of the authority and presence of the central
government (and the accompanying facilitation of
local politics) to the State Department. However, like a
rock thrown in a pond, every action in COIN affects
not only its own immediate sphere, but the remaining
spheres as well. Segregated authorities promote a
parochial perception of the war—I’ll do my part without your interference, you do yours and I won’t meddle, and everything will be peachy. Each department
has responsibility for its programs, but no one has
responsibility for their effects. This disjunct contradicts
what is necessary, and what the government literature
recognizes is necessary—a truly integrated program
which facilitates action when appropriate and restraint
when not.
A unified authority would allow true integration.
Rather than three separate leaders, each biased in
behalf of the positive effect of his own action in his
own sphere and less concerned about its effect on
other areas, a single PRT leader would have the
authority to lead all action, no matter the sector, and
be accountable for all effects in every sphere. Such a
dynamic would be a significant improvement over
the current management model in which effects, but
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not accountability, extend beyond the originating area
of action. Decisionmaking might still suffer from the
American bias toward mensurable action. But the
separation of authority to act from responsibility for
effects would no longer exacerbate this tendency.
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SECTION VIII. A NEW STRUCTURE
As in the first half of the Vietnam War, a multitrack
chain of command has plagued efforts in Afghanistan.
The administration should impose unified authority
over the American efforts, designing an organization
to support a strategy, not vice versa. As in Vietnam, the
government should create a new hybrid organization,
comprised of employees of deployed departments,
dedicated solely to guiding the American effort in
Afghanistan, and enduring only as long as the war.
This new entity would focus participants on the fight,
rather than on the interests of their parent departments.
The chain of command should reflect the political
strategy, operations, and tactics of a COIN campaign.
Following the CORDS model at the tactical level,
Regional Commands and PRTs should be directed by
either a civilian (from USAID or State) with a uniformed
deputy, or a military officer with a civilian deputy,
as determined by the level of violence in the area of
responsibility; the commander would be responsible
for the performance within the entire assigned geographic area, and would have requisite authority
over all team members, no matter their home agency.
Furthermore, PRTs should subsume maneuver units,
bringing them under the civil-military team commander; a military officer should invariably lead
provinces where strike groups still operate. At the
theater level, all American efforts, civilian and military, should be unified under a civilian Chief of Mission
with real authority, aided by a military deputy.
Considering the growing role of ISAF, all operations in
Afghanistan, no matter the responsible country, should
fall under the authority of a senior NATO Ambassador,
with a senior NATO general as deputy.
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MODEL
The Country Team.
COIN demands meticulous civilian guidance
as forces negotiate the political intricacies of the
host country, at a local as well as national level—a
civilian is best equipped to provide this direction,
and furthermore shows the population a model of military subordination to political control. Additionally,
civilian leadership would facilitate the access of the
various departments to military resources. Finally,
recognizing that the qualities of the individual leader
have a tremendous impact on the effectiveness of the
campaign, the use of a presidential representative of
ambassadorial rank allows the President to choose
from all possible candidates, civilian, and recently
retired military.
In Afghanistan, a civilian proconsul should guide
all American efforts. War is always an extension of
politics in its macro effect, and insurgency is political
at the micro level as well. No matter the military
might, the effectiveness of COIN is still constrained
by political goals. These goals are linked to the means
that the Afghan government is willing to expend and
the compromises opponents and partners are willing
to make. In general, the State Department is better
suited than DoD to handle the vagaries of negotiations that guide political efforts in Kabul and the provinces. Additionally, ambassadorial leadership of all
American efforts will give a civilian face to the host
nation, signaling to the young Afghan government
the importance of civilian control of the military.
In addition to aligning practice with theory, civilian leadership of a unified civil-military country team
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would have two practical benefits. First, the military
will continue to play a very large role in Afghanistan
due to its advantages of resources over the civilian
agencies. Until Congress closes the gap in resources,
which is unlikely in the near future, placing a civilian
at the head of the integrated operational chain of
command will have the same effect that Komer
achieved in Vietnam (or perhaps greater, as Komer
was still subordinate to the Commander of MACV)
—a dramatically increased availability of military resources to the civilian departments.
Moreover, this system will give a President more
flexibility in choosing his proconsul. The path to
flag rank is fairly rigid in peacetime, and recently
the executive has been reluctant to interfere in this
military process. However, the President always
appoints ambassadors. Furthermore, the nominee is
often found outside the State Department. By placing
the ambassador at the head of the Country Team,
the President may pick whatever American is bestsuited for the particular challenges—a person who
has proven not only to have substantive expertise,
but more importantly is an outstanding leader who
understands the exigencies of war as well as Afghan
culture. Whatever the professional origins, the
President will grant the ambassador the authority to
control all American assets in Afghanistan, and hold
him accountable for progress.
If an ambassador is to assume this role, the country
team staff must expand dramatically to accommodate
the increased responsibility. General Barno recognized
this when he seconded some of his military staff to
Ambassador Khalilzad. One FSO who served at a PRT
noted that currently in Afghanistan, the departmental
representatives on the Country Team served not as
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a staff but rather as a looser “council of advisers . .
. unable to get anything done. Even if they all agree
on something, there is no implementation process.”1
An invigorated Chief of Mission (CoM) requires a
robust staff so that he can plan, implement, direct, and
monitor all American programs, civilian and military,
in Afghanistan.
The Tactical Level.
From the country team down to the tactical level,
a single chain should guide all action. A mix of
military commanders, with a civilian deputy, or senior
diplomats, with an O-6 executive officer, should lead
the Regional Commands. Reporting to the Regional
Commands, PRT commanders should be military with
a civilian deputy and vice versa. In stable provinces
with no strike units present, the civilian should lead;
as is the case with the CoM, this will present an example of civilian supremacy over the military to the
provincial government.
No maneuver units should escape tactical integration. General Barno extended the principle of
geographic responsibility to the Regional Commands;
his logic should apply to the provincial level. A
uniformed PRT leader would supervise maneuver
units to ensure that their operations did not undermine the PRT’s broader mission. This shift to the
PRT would accelerate a cultural shift within the
military, elevating command of a team to the most
coveted position available to a colonel, thereby
encouraging the conception of command as a holistic,
not simply kinetic, duty. This subordination of the
maneuver unit to the PRT is particularly suited for the
intensity of the war. It is rare that insurgents coalesce
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in company-sized bands. Army planners might split
the current battalions into maneuver companies. When
accompanied by American airpower, a company
will usually be sufficiently powerful to defeat any
large insurgent units. Should circumstances demand
a larger group, the PRT commander or Regional
Commander could organize a contingency joint task
force, comprised of maneuver companies contributed
by one or, if insufficient, several PRTs.
This proposal raises concerns that reconstruction
might be conflated with the strike mission. Many claim
that locals are more comfortable with PRT personnel
than tactical units because the teams are able to
disassociate themselves from the tough tactics of the
maneuver battalions. These concerns are legitimate.
However, under this new structure, maneuver elements would work for a PRT leader, responsible for
the entire American portion of the COIN campaign
in the province. Afforded real authority, this leader
could modulate the tactics employed by a strike
unit, reducing the gap between its approach to the
population and that of the team.
ISAF.
This paper has focused on American efforts in
Afghanistan. Increasingly, other ISAF nations bear the
burden of the campaign; today, nearly half the troops
hail from coalition partners. Most of the American
military effort now, appropriately, falls under NATO.
Because of cultural differences between nations
and the difficulty each country has in coordinating its
own varied efforts, American forces should integrate
with ISAF at the level of high command, but not the
tactical level. The United States currently commands
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the East Region, which demands the most resources
and personnel; the remaining four fall under Italian,
British, German, and Turkish commands.2 In this
new model, RC responsibility would be proportional
to personnel contributions, giving the United States
a second RC to accompany the eastern region.
The proconsular Chief of Mission would direct all
American forces, civilian and military, within the U.S.
RCs, and all American resources would be focused
in these regions. Ideally, Congress would fund the
American effort through a war budget, rather than
within individual departmental budgets, giving
this ambassador broad financial control. Other ISAF
contributors would provide military as well as civilian
reconstruction and diplomatic personnel to their
regions of responsibility.
Should American personnel offer a unique capability needed outside of the American regions, these
units, whether civilian or military, should be put under
the operational control of the relevant PRT,3 whatever
its nationality. However, since the cultural gulf is truly
wide between different national governments, this
should be done only when absolutely necessary. A
senior NATO Ambassador should preside over ISAF
efforts; reporting to him should be a Senior NATO
general. As long as the United States contributes half
of the forces, an American should hold one of these
two positions. If other nations adopted a model similar to the proposal for the United States, the RCs
could report directly to ISAF command which would
direct all civilian and military programs, eliminating
the need for an American proconsul. As this is unlikely,
a powerful ambassador will be needed to direct the
two American RCs.
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This coalition management arrangement, focused
on the regions, would eliminate many pan-Afghanistan programs (with a few exceptions, such as the
ring road, that must be managed by a single party no
matter what regions are involved), accepting that cost
for the benefit of integrated spheres at the local and
regional levels. At the coalition level, this system is less
than optimal,4 creating potential for a NATO member
to finance local projects in its own geographic area that
are difficult for the ISAF commander to coordinate with
projects run by other nations in the neighboring regions
(the ISAF commander has only tenuous influence over
each country’s reconstruction programs). But these
inefficiencies are inevitable in coalition warfare with
different sovereigns. At the local and regional levels,
there is no need to incur such a cost for American
multiagency operations.
Achieving the New Model.
Practically, how might this integrated model
operate? It will not give the leaders of the new
organization the same power as military command—
for example, the civilian leader could not mete out
nonjudicial punishment. But it will certainly give each,
from ambassador to team leader, the same level of
authority over the other departmental representatives
as exercised within a civilian organization. This
includes the power to direct activities, the responsibility for managing subordinates (including hiring,
firing, and evaluation), and control of the integrated
funding that had previously been divided along departmental lines. The new organization should also
have substantial influence over deployment schedules.
An effective leader will rely on subordinates for the
execution of tasking within their spheres. Furthermore,
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the leader will be responsible for all the operations of
the lieutenants—in this case all American security,
political, and development activities at the provincial,
regional, or mission-wide level. One arbiter will be
able to balance the competing priorities of each sector’s
advocate with the broader effects of single actions
across the spectrum.
AID and State representatives do not have as many
leadership opportunities as their military counterparts. But this does not mean that neither agency
has any good leaders. The number of such authority
positions open to USAID and State would be low,
perhaps 6-8 PRTs and one RC; each organization
would need to find fewer than five good leaders. The
mission will attract enterprising candidates, many
with military experience who crave a return to
leadership. To complement this self-selection, the
departments should create career incentives, such as
accelerated promotion, to reward those who serve PRT
tours. Additionally, they could advertise PRT duty as
the most challenging, and noble service. With this combination, State and USAID would recruit superior
volunteers to fill allotted positions.
The most difficult dynamic will be civilian leadership of uniformed members on a PRT—without military
training, experience in giving orders, and familiarity
with the mortal consequences of combat, how might
USAID and State officials direct soldiers? Selection
processes and a formalized command relationship
would help overcome these obstacles. A board for
the new organization, comprising members of every
participating department, should select the team
leaders—criteria should always include leadership
and usually military experience. Additionally, explicit
command guidelines might mandate that while a
civilian team leader can order or cancel operations, he
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should leave the tactical guidance of the operations to
his military XO. Finally, civilians will lead teams only
in stable provinces, with no maneuver units.
CODA
The lack of unified authority is not the only hindrance to our COIN effort in Afghanistan. The chief
challenges are the inability of the Afghan government
to provide for and control its people; the tenacity,
diversity, and adaptability of the enemy; and the
Pakistan haven for insurgents. Other obstacles include
the distance between coalition personnel and Afghan
officials, low coalition manning, organizations illsuited for expeditionary work, and a poor understanding of Afghan history, culture, and languages. Coalition warfare brings more problems—restrictive
national rules of employment limit field work, fickle
domestic politics induces operational conservatism if
not paralysis, and cultural and doctrinal differences
between allies inhibit cooperation. Nor is absence
of a clear command system the only impediment to
improved American country team or PRT performance.
Integration per se will not overcome the shortage of
civilian staff and insufficient number of teams (25
provincial teams as compared with 44 provincial and
250 district teams in Vietnam). I have focused on the
chain of command because, unlike many of the other
issues, its reform would demand almost no additional
funding, the change would require little extra (and
only for the CoM’s staff) in manning, and its effects
on our COIN efforts would be immediate.
PRTs are the centerpiece of our COIN efforts in
Afghanistan. Yet no one in the field knows what single
leader or organization is responsible for the program’s
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performance. The same lack of unitary accountability
mars our nationwide programs. This problem is
especially galling since the U.S. government has not
even begun to replicate the half-decade reform effort
that led to CORDS and has ignored its own warfighting principles so clearly expounded in GoldwaterNichols and the Joint publications. What is surprising
is not that the bureaucracies, eager to protect their
prerogatives, should resist integration, but that the
government should hope to produce the effect of unified
authority (i.e. unity of effort) without employing the
proven mechanism.
PRTs are not without success. They have contributed significantly to the extension of Kabul’s power
into the provinces. Nor is the current structure without
merit—collocation has brought departments together
at the tactical level, which is bound to increase the level
of coordination between members. But even in the
best functioning team with conscientious personnel,
the maintenance of departmental stovepipes separates
authority for action from responsibility for effects and
may undermine ad hoc attempts at integration. When
personalities do not mesh, the result is much worse,
as one team member, safely distant from oversight,
may opt out of operations. These lessons in some ways
apply even more strongly to our regional and national
efforts, which are not collocated like PRTs and lose
out on the corresponding benefits.
Some propose a consensus model for multiagency
command. Consensus is a leadership style, and can be
very effective. Involved in the creation of a program,
subordinates feel invested in its execution and remain
motivated through its duration. However, consensus
is not a system of management. An organization
dependent on agreement from every member for
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decision will either drift towards paralysis or issue
vapid decrees. Inevitably, each participant has a different conception of effectiveness, and the only way
to achieve complete agreement is to create a product
that is worse than the sum of the individual parts—
one that, in the case of the U.S. Government, preserves
the sacred elements of each individual bureaucracy in
order to buy assent. While none dispute the need for
integrated response, each institution’s most important
goal is usually to preserve an area of expertise or other
turf for itself—this exacerbates the natural tendency of
fragmented responses to a challenge.
I have proposed a CORDS-style command structure, with some important enhancements—an organization that has the authority to direct all American
activities in Afghanistan, no matter the parent department, and has responsibility for all effects. As declared
in JP 1, unified authority will create true unity of effort
horizontally (across the departments) and vertically
(from municipal to national programs). The proposed
structure puts the ambassador in charge of all efforts,
with authority delegated to leaders of the three
primary expeditionary departments who will direct
the RCs and PRTs. Authority and accountability will
rest in the same chain. This structure gives flexibility
to the hybrid organization, allowing the appointment
of the most appropriate professional for the demands
of the particular province, region, and country.
This paper offers one proposal, not the only
possibility. There are practical reasons for skewing
authority towards civilians. But any arrangement of
concentrated authority in an able and eager manager
with real control over all aspects of the effort is better
than the current ambiguity. Put someone in charge
and demand leadership.
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their assistance programs.
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From NATO/OTAN Afghanistan
afghanistan-2006/afghanistan_e.pdf.

Briefing,

2006,

APPENDIX I

available

at

www.nato.int/docu/briefing/

APPENDIX II

Image from T. Malupit, ed., Vietnam and CounterInsurgency, Quezon City, Philippines: Eastern
Construction Company, Inc., 1967, p. 153.
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Image from T. Malupit, ed., Vietnam and Counter-Insurgency, Quezon City, Philippines: Eastern
Construction Company, Inc., 1967, pp. IX-67.

APPENDIX III

APPENDIX IV
Acronyms
AID — see “USAID”
AO — Area of operations
AOR — Area of responsibility
ARVN — Army of South Vietnam
CA — Civil Affairs
CCDR — Combatant Commander
CENTCOM — U.S. Central Command
CERP — Commander’s Emergency Response
Program
CFC-A — Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan
CIA — Central Intelligence Agency
CJCMOTF — Coalition Joint Civil-Military
Operations Task Force
CJTF-180 — Combined Joint Task Force 180
COIN — Counterinsurgency
COM — Chief of Mission
COMUSMACV — C
 ommander, U.S. Military
Assistance Command-Vietnam
CORDS —Civil Operations and Revolutionary
Development Support
CSTC-A — C
 ommander, Security Training
Command-Afghanistan
DEPCORDS — Deputy for CORDS
DOD — U.S. Department of Defense
DOS — U.S. Department of State
DPSA — Deputy Provincial Senior Adivisor
FSO — Foreign Service Officer
GS — General schedule (U.S. government seniority
scale)
GVN — Government of South Vietnam
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GWOT — Global War on Terror
HQ — Headquarters
IED — Improvised Explosive Device
IGO — Intergovernmental organization
ISAF — International Security Assistance Force
JFC — Joint Force Commander
JP — Joint Publication
JSOTF — Joint Special Operations Task Force
MACV — Military Assistance Command-Vietnam
MOI — Ministry of Interior
MP — Military Police
NATO — North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO — Non-commissioned officer
NGO — Non-governmental organization
NLD — New Life Development
NSPD — National Security Presidential Directive
NVA — North Vietnamese Army
O-5 — Lieutenant Colonel rank in U.S. military
O-6 — Colonel rank in U.S. military
OCO — Office of Civil Operations
OHDACA — Overseas Humanitarian Disaster
Assistance and Civil Aid
POLAD — Political Advisor
PROVN — Program for the Pacification and LongTerm Development of South Vietnam
PRT — Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSA — Provincial Senior Advisor
QIP — Quick Impact Project
RC — Regional Command
RDS — Revolutionary Development Support
RF/PF — Regular Forces and Popular Forces
RMA — Revolution in military affairs
SOCOM — Special Operations Command
UCMJ — Uniform Code of Military Justice
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UN — United Nations
UNAMA — U.N. Assistance Mission to Afghanistan
USAID — U.S. Agency for International Development
USDA — U.S. Department of Agriculture
USIA — U.S. Information Agency
VC — Viet Cong
XO — Executive Officer
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